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
CONCERNING THE PROGRAMME OF THE L.C.Y.

ABOUT THE ARTICLE OF „JEN MIN JI BAO“

A NEW PHASE IN THE EAST-WEST NEGOTIATIONS

Dr. Aleš BEBLER

State Under-secretary in the Secretariat for Foreign Affairs



DISCUSSIONS have been opened in Moscow between the ambassadors of the three Western powers and the Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs, as the beginning of the preliminary phase or one of the preliminary phases in the realization of the idea about a meeting between the top statesmen.

The Soviet Minister is meeting with each of the ambassadors separately. Days and days go by between one meeting and another. The ambassadors, at least one of them, make trips abroad, to Copenhagen and Paris.

Is this evidence of thoroughness and perseverance in the work being done? Or is it a deliberate slowness and cumulation of fresh disputed ques-

tions as regards the further procedure particularly?

Until we have learned the content of the first exchanges of opinion it will be hard to find an answer to these questions. However, much as we might incline to optimism, we cannot shut our eyes to the reasons for a certain anxiety. And those reasons occur not only in that the realization of the idea about a summit meeting — launched nearly half a year ago — is making such slow progress, but in what, especially, these preparations are accompanied by, by what is taking place in the sphere of the East-West relations and generally in international relations parallel with the talks and preparations for such a meeting.

Readers watching world events have no use for a listing of geographic facts ranging from the Arctic to Indonesia, nor of quotations of the statements which had been heard in the chambers of the Security Council and the Palais de Chaillot. They know and everyone feels that the international atmosphere is deteriorating somewhat, and that the chances for a convention and the success of the great conference are minimized to some extent thereby.

Is this reason enough to give up the very idea of such a conference, as is counselled, for example, by the former U. S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson? Is one to conclude therefrom that those numerous — more nume-

rous than is ordinarily believed — fatalists might be right, after all, who consider that the contradictions of our time are such and so deep that they cannot be mitigated by conscious action toward pacification to the extent of a peaceful development and gradual settlement of those contradictions becoming feasible?

In our opinion, the new reasons for anxiety should provide a fresh incentive for a conscious and persevering action toward international pacification. They provide fresh evidence that new means are needed for such a pacification, different and more efficacious than the routine and customary contacts through diplomatic channels and the sessions of different United Nations organs.

Such a new means would be a conference of chiefs of state.

It was not accidental that this idea, the moment it was launched, had aroused such attention and fired such a large part of world public opinion. It was not accidental, either, that — after much hesitation, it is true — all those states have formally approved it whose participation in the conference is indispensable for the success of this undertaking.

With this the idea of a conference of chiefs of state, so to speak, has ceased being the „property“ of those who had launched it, and even those who had formally accepted it. It has become the cause of the whole mankind.

The relations between the great powers affect all peoples today. Whatever is happening between them affects the interests of all others too. Their clash is rocking the whole world. A war between them would be a world war.

These are banal truisms. But it is not superfluous to underline them again, whenever there is an impression that they are being forgotten, whenever it may appear that some great powers have no sense of responsibility before the remaining countries and behave as though their relations with other great powers concerned but themselves.

At the last meeting of the NATO Council a communiqué was adopted in which it was said, *inter alia*, that „the holding of meetings between the highest-ranking representatives is advisable provided that they offered prospects of reaching settlement of significant questions“, and, further, that

such conferences „must be adequately prepared and held in an auspicious atmosphere“.

That is a lot of conditions! And all of quite a subjective nature, I mean to say, conditions such that one side alone may judge, at its discretion, by „impression“, whether they have been fulfilled. It has to gain the conviction that prospects have been provided for success, that the preparations have been adequate and that the atmosphere is auspicious!

Adding thereto all the remaining conditions, too, which both sides are stipulating or will yet stipulate regarding the further procedure, the composition of the consultations in the succeeding phases of the realization of the conference idea, and lastly, regarding the composition of the agenda of the conference itself — we have to conclude that the prospects are not rosy at all.

Starting from the standpoint — of the adequacy of which we are deeply convinced that the governments of the great powers bear responsibility for the realization of the conference before their own and all other peoples, we have perfect authority to seek such acts of them which shall facilitate and ultimately render possible both the calling of the conference and its success.

In the matter of preparatory actions for calling the conference — prepara-

tory actions in the narrower, the formal sense — it should, first of all, be sought of the great powers to show magnanimity in the treatment of procedural questions, to avoid the danger of subordinating questions of the essence to procedural ones and according a prime significance to efforts for gaining procedural advantages.

In the matter of preparatory actions in the wider, the non-formal, sense it should be sought of the great powers to make efforts to improve the international atmosphere, so that the most advantageous conditions may be created for calling the conference and its proving successful.

Inevitably so, this second demand is fairly abstract, yet the great powers could concretize it in many directions, including even those connected with the chief subject matter of the future conference, to wit, in the domain of the armaments race.

But if, through anyone's fault, an improved atmosphere is brought about before the conference, then we shall have to demand, despite the non-improved atmosphere, or, rather, just on account of such an atmosphere, that the summit conference be called with still greater urgency and in composition such as will afford the maximum chances for its success.

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Materials from the Seventh Congress of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia

INTRODUCTION

THE SEVENTH CONGRESS of the Yugoslav League of Communists was held in Ljubljana at the end of April in an atmosphere of a constructive working consultation and genuine democracy which is one of the fundamental features of socialist development in Yugoslavia as a whole. If the unity of the delegates in their approval of the policy of the Central Committee of the League and the unprecedented unanimity in adopting the directives governing the activities in the forthcoming period are taken as the basic impression and lesson of the Congress, the essential democratism manifested during this event would constitute its second vital characteristic.

The extensive agenda of the Congress required great efforts of all the delegates. The huge task that confronted them, namely the appraisal of all forms of activity of the Communist League and the analysis of all aspects of the struggle for socialist democracy, independence and peace in the world, as well as the absorbing work on the draft of the new Programme and Statute of the League, could not have been fulfilled in the work of the plenary sessions so that a large part of the delegates' activities took place within the commissions. The organs of the Congress and the commissions were formed by the individual problems dealt with at the Congress and the overwhelming majority of the delegates took active part in one way or other in their work; to the Working Presidency, Secretariat of the Congress and Editing Commission, to the Programme Commission, Statute Commission, Resolution Commission, Commission for Problems of the Social — Political System, Economic Policy, and Policy in other Fields of Public Life, the Commission for the Political, Organizational and Ideological Work of the League of Communists and the Commission for Foreign Policy and the Problems of the International Workers Movement. Although the work of the Commissions was extended from day to day in order to enable all who wished to state their opinions, objections and suggestions on any problem dealt with, it was even necessary to limit the time of all speakers without exception. This desire of all delegates to contribute to the full success of the Congress by their active participation, invested the work of the commissions with an unusually creative atmosphere.

The fact that all reports were printed well in advance and distributed to all participants in the Congress made it notably easier for the delegates to bring a definite opinion on all the Congress themes and prepare extensively for the discussion. This is all the more significant in the case of the Programme which was printed in several hundred thousand copies and became available in the bookshops some time before the Congress. All the elementary organizations of the League of Communists, all members of the League and all Yugoslav citizens had the opportunity of becoming acquainted with this exhaustive historical document and submit their suggestions and remarks to the Programme Commission of the Central Committee for the Draft of the Programme. Full use was made of this democratic facility, so that it was possible to perceive the basic outlines of the modifications of the Programme already prior to the congress and which further elaborated during the Congress. Thus the new Programme of the Yugoslav League of Communists whose definite text will be off the press in the course of this month already, is in the real sense of the word a document in whose draft the broadest strata of the Yugoslav peoples took part. The same applies to the Statute of the Yugoslav League of Communists and all other decisions of the Seventh Congress which were carefully prepared and elaborated and as such unanimously adopted by all delegates. The democratism characteristic for all phases in the work of the Congress was also manifested in the election by secret ballot for the new Central Committee, while the results of the voting constitute the most convincing proof of the unanimity of the candidates and their complete confidence in the policy of the Central Committee, the members of the Executive Committee headed by Comrade Tito having been unanimously elected to the new Central Committee of the Yugoslav League of Communists.

In view of the fact that an article on the Draft Programme of the League was published in the Moscow review „Komunist“ precisely at the time of the Congress, all participants in the Congress received the integral text of the article thus enabling them to form their opinion on the subject. This is another democratic act which also formerly characterised the practice applied in Yugoslavia in this respect.

In this issue the editors of the „Review of International Affairs“ aware of the far-reaching significance of the Congress materials for all foreign readers who wish to become acquainted with all aspects of the Yugoslav reality are publishing extracts from the report of the Secretary General of the Yugoslav League of Communists Comrade Tito, and the member of the Executive Committee of the Yugoslav League of Communists Edvard Kardelj.

JOSIP BROZ TITO

Secretary General of the LCY

The Tasks of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia

WE WERE compelled to note at the Sixth Congress of our Party that the world was turning in a hopeless circle, a situation really disturbing and depressing in regard to the solving of controversial international problems and achieving lasting peace, towards which mankind is so overwhelmingly aspiring. Unfortunately, today, though more than five years have passed since, we are unable to say that any special progress has been made in this respect.

Thirteen years have passed since the war, the most terrible event in the history of mankind in the magnitude of human and material losses, has ended and yet there are no signs that some responsible leading people of today have learned the necessary lessons from that terrible tragedy. Moreover, though millions of graves from the world's second tragedy are still fresh, though the traces of bloodshed have not yet been washed away, blood has flowed again and fresh devastations have begun. No sooner had the war in Vietnam and Korea ended a war began in Egypt, which was stopped exclusively by the energetic action of the United Nations. Unfortunately, however, wars are still being prosecuted in Indonesia and in Algeria, which indicates that some persons intend to continue the old practice of violence and devastation against the peoples who seek nothing more than to be their own masters. In some minds the idea prevails that only with force and by superiority in armaments can various controversial problems be settled and that they can attain their goal by doing so. Such views have led to an unparalleled armament race and to the introduction of new instruments of mass extermination, especially atomic and hydrogen weapons. There are tendencies to employ the greatest achievements of human genius not for the promotion of happiness and prosperity to plunge mankind into the worst catastrophe the human mind can imagine.

What has been the essence of this course of development in international relations since World War II?

First, in the matter of postwar alignment in the world, the opposing interests of the principal members of the anti-Hitlerite coalition, the great Western powers and the Soviet Union, clashed. Second, the attempt to reduce the contradictions of their interests through agreement at the conferences in Teheran, Yalta, Berlin and elsewhere, attempts at solving some other international problems affecting other nations, especially those which were independent and which are entitled to decide their own fate themselves, was a failure. Third, after the war the existing differences were also aggravated by the so-called struggle against Communism pursued today by immensely powerful reactionary quarters in the leading countries of the world. Communism is presented as a bogey, which should frighten not only their own but also other peoples, and Communist is the attribute attached not only to all progressive movements but also to peoples striving to become independent. The idea of a crusade against Communism forms an ideological foundation for the achievement of various imperialist aims, and especially of new forms of colonial subjugation. This contributes not only a severe impediment to the solution of present-day international controversies and to peaceful cooperation and coexistence between

states with different social systems, but also strongly increases the permanent danger of war on a world scale.

These are the essential elements which have led the present international situation into an impasse which shows no outlet unless some of the most responsible leaders among the great powers who are in a position to decide present and future policy, radically change their old ideas about international relations i. e. unless they realize that many things have changed in the world today and that it is necessary to approach with realism and daring the creation of international relations which coincide with the aspirations of mankind with the real interests of their peoples and with the present day level of economic, scientific and cultural development.

The great Western powers are attempting to vindicate the present course of their policy by citing certain aspects of the foreign policy of the Soviet Union as pursued during the Stalin period. It is a historical fact that Stalin was one of the protagonists at the meetings at which the fate of other independent nations was discussed, without their knowledge and approval. Such a concept was based on big-power principles and not on the principle of the right of every people to decide its own fate. In the postwar period some big powers have stopped at nothing to achieve domination over other peoples and in the world in general. An example of such a foreign policy, was, unfortunately, Stalin's protracted pressure against Yugoslavia. No fundamental ideological fronts were in question but only the desire to subjugate Yugoslavia to Stalinist policy.

This policy was bound to suffer defeat, for it failed to take into consideration whether or not, actual possibilities existed to realize the policy of intimidation by force. Moreover, it had the opposite effect. It played into the hands of the other side, where there were extremely strong, and at that time still latent tendencies, to dominate other nations and the world in general. Furthermore Stalin's policy resulted in the gradual isolation of the Soviet Union for it aroused the mistrust of the small peoples towards that country socialism from which they rightly expected the greatest support for their independence and equality.

Owing to Stalin's inflexible and uncalled for threatening foreign policy, seeing that they would be unable to accomplish their aims by diplomatic means, the big Western powers decided they would be able to do so by displaying force. This was the basic reason for the formation of the Atlantic Pact, for the creation of a military bloc that should serve the accomplishment of world domination and the attainment of aims from positions of strength. This is still the goal of the NATO powers, and no means are spared in the armament race and the achievement of superiority in military technical developments. The formation of the military Atlantic Pact and the inclusion of Western Germany in this pact inevitably had to result in the formation of the Warsaw Defence Pact of the East European countries as a counterpoise to the Atlantic Pact.

But this situation created a dangerous obstacle which not only prevents the establishment of confidence and rapprochement between the countries of the opposed sides, but also widens the breach between them, which, at one moment

more at another less, feeds the cold war. The division of the world into blocs was the cause of division of the world's economy which inflicted much damage to the peoples instead of bringing about economic integration and fruitful international cooperation. The embargo imposed by the Western countries on various products destined for the socialist countries cause not only economic damage to both sides but also, in the political sense, widened the gap between the East and West. This embargo substantially strained the relations between the East and the West.

Until recently this policy pursued by the Western countries almost completely paralyzed trade between the members of the Atlantic Pact and the socialist countries.

Naturally it had to become clear and it is becoming more and more obvious that this policy of economic pressure must fail. The chain of economic blockade is, of course, yielding more and more at the present time, for the strivings towards economic integration are extremely strong in all the countries of the world. The productive forces in many countries have achieved an exceedingly high degree of development and are irresistibly striving towards general economic integration in the world. Putting barriers in the way of the process of economic integration means not only fettering the further development of the productive forces but, at the same time politically, creating very strong antagonistic elements in international relations, which leads to unusually strong tension contributing even more to the aggravation of the cold war and threatening to turn into an armed world conflict.

While, on the one hand, the United States, exercised its efforts to weaken, by embargo and economic pressure, the eastern countries as much as possible, it gave, on the other hand, enormous resources not only to the members of the Atlantic Pact but also to other countries for the purpose of economic reinforcement and of preventing various economic and thereby political crises. There is no doubt that the proposed aim was reached, for in this way the European capitalist countries really succeeded in preventing, for a time, a repetition of the history of the economic and social crises of the period between the two wars.

During the period since World War II, there has ensued a growing anti-communist ideological conception in the United States which serves its strategic interests. This has inevitably led to strong polarization between the two ideological fronts. I am speaking of ideological fronts because it would be a mistake to speak of ideological blocs for the simple reason that the anti-communist conception and propaganda of America is not directed merely against the countries which are building socialism but also against communist ideology and the progressive movements on a universal scale.

During the last few years, the members of the Atlantic Pact have been undertaking with increasing intensity various steps to strengthen the countries of the Atlantic Pact both in the strategic and the military-technical respect. Strategic military bases are being built at the most rapid rate in Europe, Asia and Africa; numerous missile launching platforms are being set up, and in some countries, for instance in England, bombers loaded with atomic and hydrogen bombs are permanently in the air. In this way a strategic military encirclement is being created round the Soviet Union and the other Eastern countries.

Moreover, the most unfortunate decision has been taken — to arm Western Germany, which, together with the latest decision to arm the Bundeswehr with atomic weapons, enormously aggravated the situation in Europe, because it constitutes a major danger of a new war. The SEATO Pact in the Pacific and the Baghdad Pact in the Near East have been formed, and at present endeavours are being made to form a Mediterranean Pact with the aim, on the one hand, of disuniting as much as possible the Arab countries, and of preventing their political and economic integration, and, on the other, not only to keep colonial possessions but also to re-

store some countries, which have already won their independence, to a colonial status. This course was evidently taken by the big Western powers as a result of the fact that almost in all the Eastern countries — in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Albania and Yugoslavia — changes in the social systems occurred during or after the war. This policy of military blocs adopted by America and the Western powers was particularly affected by the victory of the Chinese revolution. It is necessary to reiterate that this course followed by the West was also affected by Stalin's inflexible policy, which resulted in the isolation and weakening of the positions of the Soviet Union in the world. This contributed to the strengthening of the positions of the Western countries headed by America, which justified the formation of the Atlantic Pact and of the strategic bases precisely by citing Stalin's power policy and inflexibility, and temporary won for it the normal support of a great part of world opinion. Such was the state of affairs in international relations up to 1953.

After Stalin's death the Soviet Union gradually altered its methods, it took the initiative in foreign policy and endeavoured, by negotiation, even at the summit level, to reach any sort of agreement, at least on the partial settlement of some international problems. Relaxation of tension was greatly helped by extremely significant preliminary measures undertaken by the Soviet Union, such as the beginning of normalization of the relations with Yugoslavia and the adoption of the Beograd Declaration, the settlement of the Austrian issue, the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the territory of China, Austria and Finland, the renunciation of territorial claims against Turkey, the liquidation of mixed commercial companies in China and in the East European countries of people's democracy and the liberalization of the relations with them, the recognition of the independent position of the young Asian and African countries, etc.

This new positive development of Soviet foreign policy, on the one hand, exercised a strong influence on the relaxation of international tension and, on the other, gradually also improved the isolated position of the Soviet Union in the world. But this change in Soviet foreign policy was interpreted, in the Western countries, quite erroneously, as an internal weakness caused by Stalin's death and by economic difficulties. In keeping with such an unrealistic evaluation, it was and still is assured that the change in Soviet policy is merely a time-gaining manoeuvre. Accordingly, the West continues to pursue a policy whose basis is the so-called position of strength, and still turns down various proposals to approach the solution of disputes with peaceful means. Maintaining this irreconcilable attitude, the Western powers continue to build up their military forces at a mounting pace, so as to gain superiority in this respect.

Fearing isolation, America and the other Western countries, under the pressure of world opinion, nevertheless had to amend in a certain sense, their inflexible attitude towards the changes in the foreign policy and the desires of the Soviet Union to relax the tension in the world. The result was the Geneva Conference at the highest level. Did the conference produce any more tangible results? Of course it did not. Nor could they have been expected. But the very fact that such a meeting took place was positive, especially in view of the many years of the cold war. This conference at least had the good point of having been held and of having thus created a better atmosphere for a further patient quest for peaceful ways of settling international controversies.

The question of a meeting at the summit level is being raised again today, a meeting which should be extended to include some countries belonging neither to the Atlantic nor to the Warsaw Pact. It is this view that we advanced last New Year's Eve. The Soviet Government proposed a meeting at the summit level and expressed the wish that, apart from the heads of the big powers, some countries outside the Atlantic and the Warsaw Pact should also take part in it. Un-

fortunately, we must state today that the Western countries reject some of the constructive proposals of the Soviet Union with various not very convincing motives and counter-proposals. We, of course, are not too optimistic in regard to the results which could be achieved at this summit conference, but we do feel that an agreement, even on one matter which troubles and worries the world at present, such as the stopping of the atomic and hydrogen tests for war purposes, would be of enormous significance for it would not only contribute to the relaxation in the world but also to the possibilities of further discussions on disarmament and to the settlement of other international problems.

The foregoing has shown that America held and still holds the main role in the postwar policy of the big Western powers; but it is necessary to mention briefly the policy of Great Britain and France. These two big powers have been, and still are, in a more unfavourable position than America, especially owing to the economic situation, mainly caused by war devastation suffered by those two countries and also owing to the burden of colonial problems. In the postwar period the structure of colonial empires was strongly shaken and began to fall to pieces. There are numerous countries, such as India, Burma, Egypt, Syria, the Sudan, Malaya, Ghana, Morocco, Tunisia, Vietnam, Indonesia and others, which have won complete or partial independence. Of course, for these and other reasons the big European powers looked for support to the United States and joined the Atlantic Pact and other organizations primarily aimed against the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries.

The substantial economic and military assistance which these countries received and are still partly receiving from the United States considerably helped them in overcoming postwar economic hardships, but also restricted freedom of their political action, for it did not always coincide with the views of these countries on different problems nor their own prospective interests. The British evaluation of a new war was quite realistic, for its point of departure was that owing to its geographical position and to the inevitable weakening of its economical and imperial position, Britain would be the losser in such a war, regardless of who would be the winner. Consequently, Britain is interested in the relaxation of international tension, lest its present positions in the world should be threatened. But, to all appearances, responsible figures in Britain today agree with America and the other partners that discussions can be held with the Soviet Union and that the corresponding aims can be achieved only from positions of strength. According to the opinion of the responsible figures in Britain, the inclusion of Western Germany into NATO and the Paris agreements offer such positions.

Similar attitude and position is held by France, though the French Government resisted the creation of European Defence Community during the Paris discussions. Owing to difficulties of an economic nature and to the struggle of Algeria for independence, France reluctantly accepted the armament of Western Germany and its inclusion into the Atlantic Pact.

As regards the other countries of the Atlantic Pact I shall say nothing here because they had a more or less secondary influence in the entire matter and in determining themselves for the Atlantic Pact and other bloc organizations they were guided by economic and other interests of their own rather than by motives of defense and ideology.

World War II substantially altered the economic and political position of the countries of Western Europe. This, of course, strongly affected the postwar alignment of the European countries most of which emerged from World War II economically extremely impoverished and politically weak. Owing to this state of affairs, the West-European countries were of secondary significance in relation to the United States in the postwar process of development of the international situation. They have lost the role they played before the war and all this left an imprint of dependence on USA as the

most powerful Western power. This was naturally also reflected in the field of policy in the formation of one single bloc of Western powers dominated not only in the military sphere but also economically and politically by America, as the strongest power.

On the other hand, the most powerful capitalist country, America, is confronted by the most powerful socialist country, the Soviet Union, round which are grouped the newly formed socialist countries — the people's democracy. This alignment can be easily accounted for also by reasons of defense, especially if one takes into consideration that the Western countries even at this late hour cannot become reconciled to the fact that the capitalist system has been destroyed in these countries and that a new socialist order is being built there. The West applies all its efforts and, by a continuous fierce propaganda and by interfering into the internal affairs of these countries, tries to hinder their normal development since it cannot achieve a return to the old and restore capitalism. Between the East and the West there is, as you see, a wide breach to which the Western propaganda keeps attributing an ideological nature in order to reach their aim more easily, namely divide the world into anti-communist and communist sectors.

There are, however, many countries which adhere to the principle that the settlement of international problems should be approached in a peaceful way, and not from a position of power politics which leads to an armament race and threatens the world with a new war. Yugoslavia belongs to the countries which adhere to this principle. These countries play a most important role in the lessening of international tension and in the prevention of further aggressive undertakings on the part of those who try to achieve their selfish aims by means of arms. The action pursued by these countries for the victory of a peaceful course in international relations takes place mainly within the United Nations and we must add that it is not without success since the principles of struggle for peace and peaceful cooperation are acquiring growing moral support of the world public.

COLONIALISM AND DEVELOPMENTS IN THE MIDDLE AND NEAR EAST

IT IS A WELL known fact that after World War II numerous countries freed themselves from colonial status. This came as a result of long years of struggle waged by the colonial peoples invincibly striving to be independent and to govern themselves in order to do away with their backwardness and underdevelopment as soon as possible. Although these new independent countries continued their internal development on the foundations of the former capitalist system introduced by the colonial powers, their further internal development was increasingly adopting the forms of state capitalism and introducing the elements typical of socialist development. It is clear, however, that most of these new independent countries have to combat extreme backwardness and underdevelopment in general and the difficulties involved in industrialization in particular. This backwardness and underdevelopment is the result of the colonial system of government, or better of the whole policy of economic servitude and exploitation, pursued for the purpose of keeping these countries in colonial subordination in the simplest manner.

The existing contradictions arising from such a state of affairs and from the relations between highly developed countries with exceptionally well developed means of production demand an urgent and efficient solution which would be of mutual interest. A solution which would take the form of international assistance extended to the developed and underdeveloped countries to enable their speedier economic progress in the interest of the whole world economy. But such

international assistance would reach its proper aim and would be efficient for the people of the undeveloped areas only if it is extended without any political or military conditions. Only in such a case would it have a progressive effect and would represent a new positive element in contemporary international economic relations and exercise a strong and favourable influence on international political relations as well. This solution is most urgently demanded by highly developed productive forces as well and it is also necessary in the interest of the maintenance of peace in the world. Such assistance should therefore not be extended under any conditions which would violate the independence of these countries and bring them in a subordinate or dependent position with regard to this or that highly developed country. If the question of assistance to the undeveloped countries should be settled in this manner the elements which at the present moment represent a major source of economic weakness and political tension in international relations would be removed.

What is the situation today in Africa and Asia, and especially in the Near and the Middle East? The process of further losses of their colonial possessions obviously caused great trouble to the colonial powers owing to the stubborn struggle waged by the colonial peoples. Every forcible effort to prevent the process of liberation of the peoples in the colonies, under existing conditions, aggravates the struggle and makes whole nations resort to the extreme measures — armed struggle — to attain their liberation. The times when the people of the colonies suffered, waited, obeyed and accumulated wealth for the colonial master countries while they themselves sank deeper and deeper into misery belong to the past. Even greater disappointments are in store for those who are unable to understand this. The countries which have already achieved their independence have a very encouraging effect and serve as an example to the peoples who are still under colonial status. These peoples realize that they can develop economically, culturally and politically only if they become independent, if they govern themselves, and if their national resources are used for their own development.

Such developments induce the colonial powers to apply all their resources to prevent the emancipation of these peoples and to attempt to maintain the remaining colonial possessions even by a display of force. Hence, on one side, the crudest suppression of liberation movements, as is the case of Algeria and Kenya, and, on the other, the pressure exercised under various aspects on those countries which have recently won their independence and freedom, such as Tunisia, Morocco, Indonesia and others. We were recently witnesses of a bloody aggression against an independent country, against Egypt, which rightfully removed the last vestiges of the colonial period violating its independence and integrity. This unaccountable act of military aggression against Egypt could have had far-reaching consequences, if the United Nations had not strongly and promptly reacted and if it was not opposed by the Soviet Union and America which were aware of the far-reaching consequences of this undertaking.

But this was not the end of the matter. Dark clouds are again gathering over the Middle East. The colonial powers want to recapture the positions lost in this part of the world. They want not only to prevent the further losses of their colonial possessions but also to recapture those they have lost. Egypt represents the greatest obstacle to the realization of these aims. And, since armed aggression did not meet with success new means are explored to destroy Egypt as a fortress of the liberation movements in Africa and in the Middle East. In the opinion of the colonial powers, Egypt represents the most powerful stronghold for those countries which resist foreign interventions and defend their independence, and for those nations of Africa who fight for their independence.

The pressure exercised against Syria last year led to the speeding up of the unification of Egypt with Syria, which were then joined by Yemen. This community now represents a

powerful point of attraction for all the Arab peoples as well as a solid basis for the stabilization of peace in this part of the world.

Although the Baghdad Pact harmed the integration of the Arab countries it could not reach its aim and completely subordinate all the Arab countries to the interests of the great powers. The attempt to establish colonialism under the pretext of filling the so-called vacuum in this part of the world failed. The Baghdad Pact whose aim was not only the strategic encirclement of the Soviet Union but also the subordination of the Arab countries to the interests of the Western countries is increasingly losing in efficiency because the Arab peoples resist such attempts as well as the formation of military bases on their territories. Nor did the communist bogey yield any results with the Arab peoples. The young Arab countries, whose peoples have themselves experienced the colonial yoke, which are imbued by strong nationalistic sentiments and striving towards full independence and democratic development cannot be accused of establishing Communism. All this is fabricated to serve as a pretext for the intervention into the internal affairs of the Arab countries. To weaken and undermine not only the unity of the Arab countries but also every country separately, subjugate them and liquidate their independence — this is the aim of neo-colonialism which should replace the classical colonialism which ruled in this part of the world.

Similar developments took place in Indonesia. The young United Republic of the peoples of Indonesia has through intrigues and interference in its internal affairs on the part of Western circles become the battle-field of civil war. United independent Indonesia hinders some Western powers in the attainment of their aims in this part of the world, and therefore, as usual, the Indonesian Government is accused of pro-Communist policy and it is very openly requested, not only through paid officers leading the rebellion but also directly through newspapers in the West, to retire and to surrender the government to the rebels. Bitter attacks by some American papers against the Indonesian Government clearly show what the whole thing is about. The purpose of the whole attack is to compel the Republic of the United States of Indonesia whose Government pursues an independent and neutral policy, to join the SEATO Pact or, by means of rebellion and civil war, to destroy the unity of the Republic of Indonesia and not only bring its parts under the influence of Western powers, but also transform them again, in another form, to colonies or semicolonial countries.

This interference in the internal affairs of Indonesia must cause anxiety everywhere, for it represents a danger of complicated international entanglement whose consequences could be disastrous.

This policy of the great powers in the Middle East and in South-Asian countries represents a great danger for peace in the world. Such a development is very similar to the events which preceded World War I and II.

All this together with the armament race and atomic and hydrogen bomb tests has created an atmosphere of great anxiety in the whole world. The barren disarmament talks deprive the future of any perspective and make it appear uncertain.

The question is whether is possible to find a way out of the vicious circle in which the world finds itself now. There are only two alternatives: either war or peaceful approach to the settlement of international problems. The vast majority of people in the world at the present moment desire peace and only a handful of irresponsible persons, who do not think of the consequences of war, desire war. Consequently, all the responsible statesmen and Governments who have peace close to their heart, and all the peace-loving forces in the world, should take much more active part in the struggle against all the elements who are playing with fire and threaten to set world aflame.

The progress of science and technology brought about an absurd situation in social relations: individuals or separate groups are in a position to decide about the use of nuclear energy for war purposes i.e. to decide about the fate of mankind. If such groups include sadists, lunatics, egoists, or individuals bored with the life of riches and luxury, they may follow the logic „Once I am gone the sun needn't shine". We obviously live in a time when the use of nuclear energy should not be decided by individuals or separate groups. All the nations, all mankind should decide about it.

We sincerely welcome the decision of the Soviet Union to stop its atomic and hydrogen bomb tests and we consider

such an act as a significant contribution of good will to an agreement not only on the stopping of such tests, but also to the prohibition of this terribly destructive weapon. Last year in the People's Assembly we passed a resolution appealing for an unilateral ending of tests.

It is high time for all the countries to stop their nuclear tests to approach seriously the talks for the settlement of disputed problems as well as the talks on disarmament and other matters. The signs of a meeting between the heads of state on the highest level has revived the hope of the peoples of the world that some kind of understanding will still be gradually brought about and that peace will be saved.

II.

Yugoslav Foreign Policy

YUGOSLAVIA achieved major results in its foreign policy during the period between the Sixth and Seventh Congress of the League of Communists.

In this period the foreign policy of Yugoslavia was founded on the principles of peaceful and all-round international cooperation on the principles of active coexistence between peoples and states, regardless of their internal social order, on the non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries, on the solution of various international problems by means of peaceful agreement and on the rejection of the use of force as a means for achieving different aims, on the equality of small and big nations, in all the fields of co-operation, on disarmament and particularly on banning the use of nuclear instruments of destruction and atomic and hydrogen bomb tests, on the liquidation of colonialism, and for the right of every people to govern itself, on the extending of economic assistance to the poorly developed countries devoid of any sort of conditions that would infringe upon the independence and integrity of the countries in need of such assistance, on the universal character of the United Nations, etc.

This consistent and independent foreign policy has created a high reputation for Yugoslavia in the world, which renders possible the hearing of its voice at various international gatherings. Yugoslavia pursued this policy persistently through the United Nations as well, giving full support to this international institution in its efforts, in its performance of extraordinarily difficult tasks and in the struggle for the affirmation of its principles.

In conformity with our desire for the affirmation of the above mentioned principles and in accordance with our aspirations for an all-round cooperation with all countries, regardless of internal social systems, in the period between the two congresses official state visits were made to Great Britain, Turkey, Greece, India, Burma, Ethiopia, Egypt, France, the Soviet Union and Rumania. These visits were of great significance in all respects, not only for our country, but also in general.

In connection with this it is particularly necessary to mention Yugoslavia's close cooperation with India, Burma, Ethiopia, Egypt, Indonesia and other countries in the foreign-political, as well as in the economic and cultural fields. These are countries which do not belong to any pact and which are pursuing very active foreign policies of peace and international cooperation. The useful direct exchange of opinions on different international problems and a more profound acquaintance with internal economic, political, cultural and social conditions of these countries in general, have rendered possible the development of a very successful cooperation with them in all questions. Because of its policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of other nations, Yugoslavia

enjoys a high reputation in that part of the world. We had an opportunity to convince ourselves that identical views on all more important questions of peaceful coexistence and the peaceful settlement of various problems. We believe that the existence of such a large number of countries having this peaceful conception is a very important factor in the present struggle for peace.

In Europe, in relations between European countries, Yugoslavia did not join any arrangements that would be directed against anyone, regardless of the difficult situation imposed upon us by the Stalinist policy. We have resolutely rejected any thought of joining the North Atlantic Treaty Organization or some other European agreement having a bloc character. However, we have endeavoured to cooperate with European countries on all questions that were of mutual benefit: we have consolidated and expanded our economic, cultural and other contacts that were of value to our country.

We regarded, and today still regard European economic integration only as a partial and incomplete solution concealing considerable negative elements in itself, particularly with regards to the domination of the economically stronger. On the other hand, this integration bears a bloc imprint and hinders the correct development of economic integration in the broader sense. That is why we did not become involved here either, nor did we accept any kind of obligations, even though our situation was not bright at the time.

OUR RELATIONS WITH ITALY

LED BY THE desire to give the greatest possible contribution to the relaxation of international tension, Yugoslavia reached an agreement with neighbouring Italy on the Trieste issue after negotiations lasting several years. The element of tension and cold war for a series of years, the problem of Trieste, was thus taken off the agenda. This subsequently enabled the increasing improvement of relations between our two countries and the development of an extraordinarily beneficial economic cooperation for both countries. We have good relations with Italy today and considerable possibilities exist for a mutual exchange of goods, because the geographical position and internal economic structures of our two countries are favourable to this. Particularly characteristic in these relations is the border traffic between Italy and Yugoslavia, which in 1957 reached the figure of 5,882,428 visitors in both directions.

Recently, our relations have been clouded only by the setting up of missile launching platforms in Italy, which can objectively endanger the independence and security of Yugoslavia. This is creating a new element in our relations we must bear in mind.

THE UNIFICATION OF GERMANY

OUR ATTITUDE toward the unification of Germany has long been known. When we took our stand we did not orientate ourselves towards anyone, as has been imputed by some Western circles, for we are pursuing our own independent foreign policy. If our foreign policy should coincide with the policy of some other country, in the case in point with the policy of the Soviet Union, it is for the best; we would like our policy and our views on international problems to coincide as frequently as possible with the policy and views of America and other Western countries.

In the determination of our attitude towards the unification of Germany, we were naturally primarily led by the interests of peace, not only in the present situation but in the distant perspective as well. We are opposed to the idea of having the problem of the unification of Germany treated as an international issue on which depends the solution of all other international problems, including disarmament. We consider the unification of Germany the matter of the peoples of West and East Germany alone. They have the right themselves to find the most suitable solution in the nearest or more distant future; and interference from outside only aggravates the unification on a realistic basis.

Owing to the historical circumstances in war and the postwar development, two German states with different social systems were formed. A capitalist system exists in West Germany and a socialist system is developing in East Germany. What is the way out of this situation now? Shall we let the world step into a new war catastrophe again on this issue? Or shall we rather help the German people regulate their mutual relations in a federated or some other democratic form in a gradual and peaceful manner, in the spirit of the principles of coexistence. Not only the German people, but the entire world, is in need of a democratic Germany that would never again be a source of fear and uncertainty to the peoples of Europe, but instead an example of high and all-round development and peaceful cooperation. Only this can be rightfully expected by the other peoples, all the rest should be left to the German people alone to decide when the German issue is discussed.

RECOGNITION OF THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF GERMANY AND THE BREAKING OFF OF RELATIONS BETWEEN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY AND YUGOSLAVIA

IN ACCORDANCE with our principle of cooperation with all countries desiring to cooperate with us on the basis of equality, and in accordance with our attitude to the existence of two German states, we were not able to postpone any longer the recognition of the Democratic Republic of Germany. This recognition would undoubtedly have come sooner had not such a situation been created in 1948 that Yugoslavia was constantly accused from that side as well. We knew that the West German Government would not accept this recognition with understanding, but we did not expect that it would go as far as to break off diplomatic relations with Yugoslavia. We consider this move of the Government of the Federal German Republic to be more detrimental to it than to us from the moral point of view, because it is well known that immediately after the war, Yugoslavia did everything to make people gradually forget what the German fascist army did to our country and peoples. Yugoslavia was the first to release the German war prisoners and even some war criminals. Yugoslavia was among the first countries to recognize the Federal Republic of Germany as a state and to establish extensive economic relations with it.

At present our relations with West Germany have the nature of economic exchange and cooperation only. The question of normal relations today does not depend on us any more, but on the West German Government.

OUR RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

OUR RELATIONS with the U. S. A. are founded on mutual respect, cooperation on an equal basis and non-interference in internal affairs. If there were certain attempts that were not in line with these principles, they usually came from individuals or groups and not from the U. S. Government. We received economic and military aid from America at a time when we were in most urgent need of it i. e. in a period of Stalin's political, economic and propaganda pressure on our country. This helped us a great deal in overcoming the tremendous difficulties we were in then. Although U. S. assistance made up only 4 percent of our national income, it would be incorrect and illogical on our part to deny the great significance of the aid we received when we were in a most difficult position. Some people in the East wanted to take advantage of this for propaganda purposes, expressing the doubt that the aid was given without any political or other concessions. But, facts are facts: we did not make any concessions of that kind, nor did anyone put such conditions at the time. However, after our visits to the Soviet Union in the summer and at the end of September 1956, and under the influence of strong propaganda on the part of reactionary papers in the West, President Eisenhower cancelled the further delivery of planes and other heavy armament to Yugoslavia while the delivery of spare parts and similar equipment continued. This did not affect us much, because already at that time we had estimated that there was no danger of aggression threatening Yugoslavia and that there would follow a period of improved relations with the Soviet Union and the other people's democracies after the visit of the Soviet delegation to Beograd and the adoption of the Beograd Declaration. In addition to this, our entire conception of a peaceful policy and of the lessening of tension already existing on the world situation, as well as our well-known attitude to disarmament and against war conflicts, was not in accordance with the further demand of armament for our Army. It is for the development of our peacetime army only that we wanted the delivery of what was already agreed upon.

In connection with this attitude and because of the strong abusive campaign in the reactionary American press, I sent a personal letter to President Eisenhower in which I actually cancelled the further planning of military assistance for reasons mentioned above. After the statement of the American Government of May 15, 1957, the delivery of equipment, which was to have been delivered before, continued, but it was more symbolical in character. At the end of 1956, General Gošnjak gave a statement to the same effect before the Federal Assembly. Therefore, we did not want our rejection to be interpreted otherwise. But, since the campaign continued in the American press even against this symbolic delivery and since our foreign policy was being constantly re-investigated, in December 1957, we cancelled all further acceptance of this aid with a motivation similar to the one I have already cited in my letter to President Eisenhower. The American Government accepted our reasons and the further delivery of military assistance ceased by mutual agreement. It did not have any detrimental effect on our political relations and on economic cooperation between our two countries. We wish, of course, to maintain good relations regardless of the termination of the kind of assistance we received to date. We want our cooperation to be on the most equal basis possible in the economic sense as well. Aid in the form of credits would undoubtedly be more suitable to us and we hope that economic cooperation in future will develop in that direction.

You already know that our relations with Greece and Turkey are in the stage of further peaceful cooperation. For the same reasons that led us to cancel the military aid, we

believed that it was necessary to give the military side of the Balkan Alliance a secondary character and to give place to a stronger economic, cultural and especially political co-operation in the struggle for peace. Friendly relations with Greece and Turkey are particularly good today, which is an example of the possibility of cooperation between countries with different social orders. Neither are there any more significant problems that could disturb the good relations with Turkey, created at the time when the Balkan Alliance was formed.

If I did not enumerate here the other European countries, particularly Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, the Latin American countries and others, that does not mean that from the economic and political standpoints our relations with these countries were not as good or useful. On the contrary, we consider our relations with these countries as good and stable. They are founded on mutually beneficial cooperation in all questions of mutual interest. I am not saying that there are not many different views between us on various problems. There are, particularly when social systems and foreign policies are in question, but it cannot in any way be the reason for rejecting cooperation on issues of common interest.

However, one could nevertheless remark that all is not going smoothly in relations with some of these countries. Many people in the West do not want to grasp the full essence and significance of the principles of coexistence, particularly the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries. An ideological war is still being waged against the countries of socialism, and in the course of the past two years some circles in the West are particularly directing their ire against Yugoslavia because of the normalization and improvement of its relations with the Soviet Union and the other East European countries.

In connection with this, let us take as an example the case of Dilas, the inspirer and agent of such anti-Yugoslav propaganda, and then the trial on charge of anti-state activity of a group of wellknown Chetniks and former socialists, who joined the Chetniks during the Second World War and collaborated with the invader. This trial was used as the basis of a campaign against our country inspired by the Second International. Unfortunately, a particularly sorrowful role in this anti-Yugoslav campaign was played by certain Labour Party and some other socialist leaders. All was set in motion to undermine the reputation of Yugoslavia on the international terrain, because these anti-Yugoslav elements are aware of the fact that they cannot do any harm to Yugoslavia on the internal level through these traitors. The power of our socialist country and the unity of our peoples are so strong, that it is simply comic even to think it possible to break its strength by means of individual traitors. That is why they are working on the foreign policy level.

The role of Yugoslavia in international developments does not please the international reactionaries and certain socialists. They likewise resent the high reputation enjoyed by Yugoslavia in the Asian and African countries, particularly among the colonial peoples and in the ranks of the working people of these countries.

Should we now dramatize such behaviour towards Yugoslavia and by our countermeasures aggravate these relations even more? That would be wrong, of course. By our example, we should make these people realize how detrimental this policy is to themselves and particularly to peace and peaceful cooperation among peoples.

OUR ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATION

IN THE PAST period Yugoslavia was very active through its representatives in the United Nations Organization. During the whole period, Yugoslavia was particularly tireless in the efforts to realize the principles of univer-

sality of the OUN, in championing the admission to this organization of all nations which, through the UN Charter, acquired the right to be admitted and particularly the recognition of the legitimate right of representation of the People's Republic of China, the absence of which in the United Nations hinders the correct functioning of this organization.

Yugoslavia always attached the greatest significance to the United Nations and to its role in the struggle for a peaceful solution of international disputes. Yugoslavia fought against the attempts to transfer the disputed issues outside the organization, which, according to the UN Charter, should be settled by the United Nations and to solve them among several big powers.

In spite of great difficulties, for which big powers are mainly responsible, the United Nations Organization has proved to be an indispensable instrument of peace and international cooperation. Constructive tendencies towards international cooperation are beginning to find more and more expression particularly among the small and medium countries interested in the most efficient performance of the role of United Nations.

Yugoslavia particularly exerted her efforts against war conflicts and aggression in general. After the aggression against Egypt the Yugoslav delegation initiated the proposal for convoking an extraordinary session of the United Nations with the purpose of an immediate halt of further aggression against this country.

In connection with the events in Hungary and with the danger of a broader conflict in Europe, Yugoslavia exerted efforts in the UNO for a settlement of this question which would ensure peace in Europe, extend an opportunity to the Hungarian people to consolidate its internal situation and secure its peaceful development.

With regard to disarmament Yugoslavia also endeavoured to contribute to the speediest possible solution of this question in a realistic way through its proposals.

With a large number of members Yugoslavia actively participated in the setting up of a United Nations fund for assistance to the underdeveloped countries. Thanks to this, strong moral influence could be exercised upon certain nations in connection with the setting up of this fund.

As an active member of the international organizations and specialized UN agencies Yugoslavia was very active in the International Labour Organization, the World Health Organization, UNESCO, FAO, as well as in the Danube Commission, the World Federation of War Veterans, the Interparliamentary Union, and many others.

Bearing in mind the importance of the support of the people for our foreign policy, the League of Communists of Yugoslavia devoted great attention to the ideological and political activities in the period between the Sixth and Seventh Congress and endeavoured to have not only the Party membership, but also the broadest masses of people, informed correctly and on time about international happenings and our foreign policy views. It was, therefore, decided at the Second Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia in June 1953, to send an open letter to all the organizations of the Communist League of Yugoslavia in which the then insufficient interpretation of international events was indicated.

Considering that the Yugoslav foreign policy must be an expression of aspirations to secure general peace and free development of socialism in our country, the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, led by these interests, developed the

broadest mass activity for the acquaintance and engagement of our peoples in the implementation of this policy. Between the Sixth and Seventh Congress, frequent meetings of the leading organs of the Communist League of Yugoslavia, the Socialist Alliance of the Working People of Yugoslavia, and

other mass organizations, which were dedicated to these problems, played a big role in the correct acceptance and interpretation of the foreign policy line of the leadership of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia and the Yugoslav Government.

III.

Normalization of Relations with Soviet Union and Other Eastern People's Democracies

ONE OF THE major and most significant events in our foreign relations since 1948 has been the normalization and improvement of relations between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union and the other people's democracies. This period has been replete with many trials and tribulations for the League of Communists of Yugoslavia as well as for our whole country. A turning point in the normalization of these relations, which has already begun, was made only upon the arrival of the Soviet delegation headed by Comrade Kruschev, and after the wellknown Beograd Declaration of 1955 was announced. Naturally, this initiative, namely the visit of the Soviet delegation, was due in the first place to certain changes in the attitudes of the Soviet leaders after the death of Stalin, whose foreign policy, and especially the policy of pressure and intimidation directed at Yugoslavia, was harmful to the Soviet Union itself.

It is not for us today to analize all the factors which have brought about positive internal changes in the Soviet Union, changes which are also reflected in Soviet foreign policy, and particularly in the policy which was confirmed by the Beograd and Moscow Declarations as documents which are to stand for principles governing relations between socialist countries, and relations in general. This was discussed at the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. As this Congress, which was of tremendous significance for the reaffirmation of confidence in the USSR and in its world role, this was confirmed also by the internal report which dealt with the personality cult and with Stalin's errors. The wrong attitude towards Yugoslavia, the unusual measures used and the pressure which Stalin exerted against Yugoslavia were followed by serious consequences not only for relations between the USSR and Yugoslavia, but also for the international labour movement in general.

In this period, as will be seen later, the international labour movement was severely damaged and weakened, but not through Yugoslavia's fault as some people wished to impute, but rather through lack of perspective with regard to proper relations between socialist countries and communist parties in general, and because of gross interference in the internal affairs of other socialist countries and parties, etc. The resistance offered by our Communist Party and by our people to such unsocialist conceptions with regard to relations between socialist countries, was of prime importance not only for our country but also for the labour movement throughout the world. It showed that the road to the further strengthening and development of the labour movement in all countries, could be found.

Consistently abiding by the principles of Marxism-Leninism even under the most difficult conditions, the League of Communists of Yugoslavia proved that all the national forces could be rallied together in the interests of socialism if the Communists conducted a correct policy for the good of their land and their people and for the construction of socialism, which, in final analysis, means also for the strengthening of the socialist forces in the world. Therefore, the mobilization of all the latent national forces in the struggle for the construction of Socialism in each country separately is not na-

tionalism but rather the strengthening of socialist forces and international progressive forces in general.

World War II was devastatingly destructive of lives and material wealth, and the world is still recuperating from it. However, it brought great changes in the world in spite of the desires of its instigators and many others who did not want it. In Eastern Europe and in Asia there has come about the creation of a whole series of states with a new social sistem. Yet, it would be wrong to assume that, because of these facts, war is a stimulating and useful thing making for social changes in the world. Indeed, at the present time, war is the greatest disaster for humanity and the fact that after World War II a series of socialist states grew up, can in no way justify it. I have felt it necessary to mention this because there are people who think that war alone can resolve the question of social changes just as there are others who think that only through war can various objective be attained, that is, can the question of "who will get the better of whom" be settled. Such a conception is not only faulty but also harmful.

But, facts are facts. The appearance of a whole series of new socialist countries has brought with it new problems — including the problem of proper relations between socialist states. These problems were not apprehended by Stalin nor by some other who followed him blindly. An entirely fallacious view was taken of the relations that should exist between socialist countries. No consideration was given to specific conditions and no account was taken of the historical development of each country individually. It was believed that socialism was an imported article and that it could develop in a standardized manner according to one precept, that is by imposing certain forms of socialist development upon other countries. This, of course led to serious consequences for the development of socialism and the labour movement in the world. After the conflict between Yugoslavia and the USSR in 1948, the consequences of the practical policy conducted by certain officials in the people's democracies were expressed in terms of the economic crisis in Poland and then, because of this policy, there came the particularly grave events in Hungary which were exploited by counter-revolutionary elements with the purpose of staging an overthrow. This dealt a heavy blow to the socialist forces in the world. It would be mistaken to deny the fact that the international and domestic reactionaries did not endeavour to make use of this crisis in order to organize and to turn it into a counter-revolution. However, even if we allow a counter-revolution to occur in a socialist country then it is we who are to blame, we Communists, because we have allowed the creation of elements of counter-revolution inside the country. It would therefore, be wrong if in estimating these crises one were to begin with the results and not the causes. This can only complicate matters because it prevents us from drawing the correct conclusions. We feel that these sad occurrences in these, to us so close socialist countries, are a good lesson for all of us Communists, and it would be tragic if this were not taken into consideration and if it were not constantly kept in mind.

After the arrival of the Soviet delegation in Yugoslavia in 1955 and the visit of our delegation in Moscow in 1956, after the talks conducted on that occasion and the publication of the well-known Declarations, a fertile atmosphere was created for very successful progress in the creation of mutual confidence and cooperation.

However, clouds in our common sky appeared again. Because of the events in Hungary, a tense situation was again created between us and the Soviet Union, but during our talks with the Soviet leaders in Rumania, in August 1957, this matter was taken off the agenda. On that occasion, we cleared up some misunderstandings and there remained very little of that which could impede our full cooperation and friendly relations. The important thing is that this is now a thing of the past, it is important that we set out along a new, proper road of cooperation and that we should forget all those past things which could influence the existing and future good, friendly relations. The essential thing is that between us there is more confidence, that we understand each other, that there exists a friendly and sincere exchange of opinions and experiences in the building of socialism, that there is mutual respect and to interference in the internal development of others — as was pointed out also in the Beograd Declaration, which was the expression of mutual efforts to efface all traces of the former abnormal situation, and to have the relations between us erected on new and sound foundations.

The Yugoslav-Soviet relations, based on the Beograd Declaration are today developing very successfully. Trade between our countries is also developing on a broad scale. A series of agreements has been signed, such as: on the construction of industrial enterprises in Yugoslavia valued at 110 million dollars, on a commodity credit amounting to 54 million dollars, on scientific and technical cooperation, on a loan in gold or foreign currency amounting to 30 million dollars, on cooperation in the field of atomic energy. In addition to this a cultural convention has also been signed on the basis of which broad cooperation is developing, as well as a convention on the regulation of dual citizenship; there has also been signed a special agreement on the construction of an aluminium plant and a fertilizer factory, etc. All this proves that the normalization and establishment of good, friendly relations has received a material basis in economic cooperation, which is of great benefit to both countries.

Similarly, there is excellent progress in the relations and fuller cooperation between Yugoslavia and Rumania, particularly since the visit made by our state and party delegation to Rumania and of the Rumanian delegation to Yugoslavia. On that occasion a declaration was signed which today, together with the Beograd and Moscow Declarations, is a basis for the development of our mutual relations and cooperation.

With Poland we are linked by very good and friendly relations which have found their reflection in the joint Declaration made while the Poland party and state delegation paid a visit to Yugoslavia in 1957. In talks conducted at that time between Poland and our delegation, there was manifested

complete mutual understanding and identical points of view on major problems in the field of foreign policy, the development of socialism in our countries, as well as the relations which should exist between socialist countries.

Relations with Hungary are continuing to improve after the conflict in connection with the events in that country, and today, with Hungary we again have useful cooperation in the economic, cultural and political field. Cooperation with Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria in the economic field is developing normally but as regards political and cultural cooperation, we should like it to be better than it is at present. Relations with Albania are still not normal through no fault of ours; these relations are not as they ought to be between two neighbouring countries.

We regret very much that certain comrades in some of these countries still manifest tendencies of distrust as well as evidence of wrong estimates of the internal development in our country. Suspicion is expressed with regard to the socialist character of Yugoslavia, there is talk of her anarchist trade union development inside the Party it is stressed, and then further spread, that a tactical altitude should be taken in connection with Yugoslavia, that she should be re-educated and again brought into the camp, etc. It is difficult for us to understand such shortsightedness and tactlessness towards our country. This is not the way to promote confidence and good relations between socialist countries and it would be very useful if these comrades would finally abandon such absurd tendencies which are only harmful and which prevent the proper development of our relations.

We are often accused of not being internationalists, because we are not in the camp. These comrades seem to think that internationalism is conditioned by adherence to the camp and not to the socialist world, in the broader sense. They do not start out from what sort of policy you are conducting, whether you are loyal to the principles of internationalism, which means solidarity with the labour and progressive movements in a universal sense, whether you are building socialism in a way which strengthens socialist ideas not only inside the country but generally speaking. Internationalism, first and foremost, obligates the working class to develop steadfastly, in its own country, on the forms of revolutionary work, while it still does not hold power in its hands, and to develop all the forms of creative work in the building of socialism when it already possesses that power. Internationalism means respect for equal relations and a comradely attitude towards those countries which are constructing socialism and towards all Communist and progressive parties outside the socialist countries. Internationalism cannot be divided into narrow and broad areas, into the camp and the non-camp groups, because it is universal in the sense that it develops the science of Marxism-Leninism and increases its practical applications. Internationalism, then, is practice, not words and propaganda. This should be borne in mind by those who like to make the classifications internationalists and non-internationalists.

IV

Socialist Yugoslavia and International Labour Movement Since the War

IN THE PERIOD between the Sixth and Seventh Congress of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, the international labour movement experienced various phases of progress but also some stagnation. The development of the international labour movement during the last few decades did not advance in step with the social events and the development of material conditions. This is particularly character-

istic of many Communist parties which in their countries did not develop into powerful political factors. They lacked bold initiative in the struggle for winning over the masses, they were engrossed in themselves and isolated from the masses and that is why they could not play any decisive role in the social development of their countries.

It is only during the last few years that a turning point has been reached in this respect, as various parties free themselves from dogma and sectarianism and seek more and more individual forms of work and struggle. They are becoming increasingly aware that revolutionary strength is not to be found only in the vanguard but that this strength is latent in the masses, which aspire towards just social changes, and that the vanguard has only to discover the right means to mobilize the masses in the struggle for their interests and in harmony with specific conditions in each country.

Present world developments require the labour movements to engage more actively in resolving international problems such as the struggle for peace, for disarmament, for the prohibition of atomic experiment for purposes of war, and the use of atomic weapons, for the rejection of war as a means for settling international problems, for the ending of aggressive pressures and belligerent adventure against certain Asian and African countries and colonial liberation movements, etc.

The working class cannot be indifferent as to whether nuclear weapons are produced or not. Humanity dreads this terrible, destructive weapons and the working class is finding itself in the situation of having itself to produce the means which threaten humanity without any really tangible opposition on its part. The fomenters of war are offering bread to the working class so that it should produce various weapons of war while saying at the same time that there is no other solution if it wants to escape from unemployment. But, together with all the progressive forces, the working class will set out on another road, the road of struggle against the armaments race.

The forces of socialism in the world today have already increased so much that, in the interest of further growth, they call for greater activity on the part of the labour movements as the leading force in the process of resolving existing contradictions in contemporary society. We are at present in a period which is exhibiting a greater measure of relations in the international labour movement which is aimed at closing breaches and resolving international conflicts. We are faced with finding solutions for a series of ideological problems which life itself has set and whose clarification inevitably imposes itself. Dogmatism, which has up to now impeded the development of creative thought, has also caused the opposite tendencies, the tendencies of anarchy and revisionism, which likewise have a destructive effect and which prevent proper development. But the fetters of a dogmatic attitude towards current problems are beginning to loosen and conditions are being created for a new, more powerful development of creative thought. Processes in the development of society have today reached such a level that they can go no further and no faster without fresh endeavours and conscious actions on the part of the working class.

During the last years of the Stalin period, the labour movement in the world, especially its vanguard, suffered greatly. In this respect, it not only stagnated but even retrogressed. The reasons for this were to be found, in the first place, in the dependent policies conducted by the various parties whose leaderships had been accustomed to receiving and implementing directives coming from outside, regardless of whether these directives were the right ones or not for the country concerned. This was typical up to the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. As the result of such a policy the growingly frequent failures experienced by the working class in its struggle, caused a lack of perspective and apathy, which was most detrimental to the forces of socialism in the world at large. Moreover, the vanguard of the working class was going through the crisis of a split. But there is no doubt that the pressure on socialist Yugoslavia, after 1948, was the hardest blow against the working class because, for the first time since the October Revolution it provoked doubts as to the correctness of the

policy conducted by a country, which, throughout this whole period, was a beacon to the international labour movement. This resulted in the fact that in the struggle of the working class, the revolutionary blade was blunted, a matter which the enemies of socialism — the international reactionaries — exploited to the utmost.

A significant positive factor and turning point in this respect was the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, at which the mistakes made during the Stalin period were subjected to sharp criticism, mistakes which were made both in the internal life and development of the USSR and in its foreign policy. The new course taken by the Soviet leaders which has given rise to new forms of cooperation between socialist countries, beginning with non-interference in their internal development and the acknowledgement that specific conditions in every country are one of the major factors in the successful building of socialism, — this new course, reflected in both the Beograd and Moscow Declarations, has contributed to a gradual show of confidence and to a renewed strengthening of the socialist forces in the world. It is especially important that the old forms of cooperation are being gradually abandoned and that bilateral relations are being adopted; this does not in any way mean that there is a weakening of the socialist world, or of its unity and effectiveness, but precisely the opposite — this makes possible the mobilization of all the forces of socialism. In this way there ensues a wealth of new forms and experiences which are placed in the service of socialism, because there is a liberation of creative thought which, obstructed by former forms of cooperation was completely dormant in the present phase of development. Because of this attitude of ours regarding cooperation between Communist parties and progressive movements in the world in general we could not sign the Declaration of the Twelve Communist and Workers' Parties of the Socialist Countries, in Moscow.

The Yugoslav experience offers countless examples of the application of democratic forms in the building of socialism, a fact which undoubtedly is a powerful factor in strengthening and spreading the socialist consciousness, in the creation of unity of national forces directed towards the construction of a new social system — that of socialism.

The organizational form of the creative forces of socialism in our country is our Socialist Alliance of the Working People of Yugoslavia. Would we have been able to rally about 11 million voters, our citizens, in the joint work of constructing the new socialist Yugoslavia; had the League of Communists of Yugoslavia not understood the aspirations of our peoples, had it not taken into account the historical elements in the growth of our country and the specific conditions which arose in this historical development? Of course we would not have been able to do that! The League of Communists of Yugoslavia would have remained isolated, the internal process of the building of socialism would have undergone grave crises, and it is difficult to suppose that our new Yugoslavia would have been able to overcome all those tremendous obstacles and weather all the storms that raged over it in the recent past, had this not been so.

The Socialist Alliance of the Working People of Yugoslavia is a very fitting organization for the development of broad cooperation with socialist and other progressive movements in the world. In this respect, good results have been achieved, and this cooperation was particularly significant for us at the time of our isolated position after 1948. From time to time, of course, this cooperation comes up against difficulties of a subjective character, such as the exceptionally strong campaign recently wages against our country by certain leaders of some socialist parties, including particularly some members of the British Labour Party, in connection with the trial of the renegade and traitor Djilas and of four former enemy collaborators, in connection with the normalization of relations with the USSR, etc. In pursuing this campaign, these circles

have found themselves adopting the same line as the most reactionary elements in the capitalist world. But such hostile attacks should not hinder us in our endeavours to continue promoting relations with these movements because this is not being perpetrated by the working masses but by certain officials and newspaper scribblers with whom these masses have nothing in common. This campaign should not disturb us though, because we know that it is not being waged solely on behalf of a morally depraved man, but rather that it is an integral part of the general struggle against socialist lands — a struggle which is now stronger, now weaker, according to the objectives aimed at, and also because, as always, they do not shrink from using any means nor do

they take into account the moral aspect of such anti-communist struggle.

The fury of some Labour Party and socialist leaders can be understood to a certain extent if it is borne in mind that ever since they established contacts with our country, they also hoped for something else besides cooperation on certain problems of general interest. They constantly hope that with the aid of such depraved persons they could undermine our unity and that a multi-party system on the Western model could be introduced into our country with all the elements that go with the restoration of capitalism. Well, they failed in this, and that is the reason for the insulting and furious campaign against our country.

EDWARD KARDELJ

Concerning the Programme of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia

IN THE FIRST three chapters relating to contemporary international social, economic and political relationship and to the task of League of Communists of Yugoslavia in the field of struggle for peace and international socialist cooperation, the Programme contains only general analysis and dwells in short on the characteristics of capitalism and imperialism, for all this belongs to the already widely accepted accumulation of socialist thought and socialist experience. It does, however, dwell more on contemporary social manifestations, on the characteristic of the present stage of the general crisis of the capitalist system and on the contemporary conditions of the struggle for socialism, as well as on the laws governing the transitional period from capitalism to socialism. In that sense the Programme especially stresses the appearance and growing role of state-capitalist tendencies in contemporary capitalist society.

In describing these processes, we do not do because we consider such state-capitalist manifestations as a more progressive form of capitalism — as is sometimes attributed to us by superficial or prejudiced critics — but because we want to point out first the intensification of the general crisis of capitalism which these tendencies reflect and second, the diverse forms and methods which the working class and socialist forces in general use under such conditions in the struggle for power and for the leading role in the life of society.

The manifestation of the considerable strengthening of state-capitalist tendencies is obviously the reflection of the high degree of development of social-economic and political factors which came to being within the fold of the former society and make the victory of socialism on a world-wide scale more and more inevitable. They are not only a form through which monopoly capitalism is endeavouring to find a way out of its internal contradictions, by preserving the system as such and the power of capitalists as such, but also an out-and-out symptom of the critical situation of the contemporary capitalist world and of the state of internal relationship among the social forces within it.

I should like to quote a few words from Engels which clearly define the importance of the intensified role of the state and thereby of bureaucracy in history in general:

„As the state has arisen out of the need to bridle class antagonisms, and as it also emerged as a result of class conflict, it is as a rule the state of the most powerful, economically ruling class which, with its help, becomes the political ruling class as well, and thereby acquires new means for the suppression and exploitation of the oppressed class. Thus the state of antiquity was above all a state of slave-owners for the oppression of slaves just as the feudal state was the instrument of the nobility for the oppression of serfs and bondsmen so is the modern parliamentary state a tool for the exploitation of wage labour by capital. However, there may be an exceptional period when the classes in conflict are so nearly balanced in strength that the state power, seemingly an intermediary, temporarily gains a certain degree of independence in relation to both sides. Such were the absolute monarchies of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, which balanced the nobility against the bourgeoisie; such was Bonapartism of the First and particularly the Second French Empire which played the proletariat off against the bourgeoisie and the bourgeoisie against the proletariat. The most recent attainment of this sort, where the rulers and subjects appear equally comic, is the new German empire of Bismarck's nation where the capitalist are balanced against the workers and both of them are being duped to an equal extent by the ruined Prussian provincial nobility....“ (Marx—Engels, Selected Works, Vol. 2).

Similar tendencies are engendered in certain forms in the contemporary general crisis of capitalism and the relationship of social forces which is typical of the contemporary capitalist world. That is why the Programme gives consideration to the manifestation of state capitalism and the strengthening of the role of bureaucracy as a symptom of the transitional period, as a symptom of the decay of capitalism, and not as a definite and special phase in the development of capitalism.

This does not, naturally, mean that monopoly capitalism which engenders such tendencies thereby becomes more progressive or less exploitative in character, or that imperialism has ceased to be the mortal enemy of the independence of peoples and a permanent source of the danger of war, or that

state-capitalist bureaucracy, which strives for greater independence is defending the interest of the top monopolist and bourgeois circles of which it is a component part, less conscientiously than the bourgeoisie itself. On the contrary, the struggle for greater independence by the state-capitalist bureaucracy is judging by what gives it incentive, nothing but one of the aspects of the struggle for a capitalist monopoly. But it is also true, on the other hand, that the appearance of such tendencies and relationships simultaneously indicates the existence of an accelerated process of internal decomposition of the capital system.

It that respect, the Programme lays particular stress on the fact that there can be no automatic transition from capitalism to socialism, transition arising from material economic necessity. On the contrary, it is precisely the growing role of state-capitalist tendencies that reaffirms Lenin's thesis to the effect that there is no absolutely hopeless situation that could drive capitalism to an automatic transition to socialism. In the final analysis, only the socially and economically interested forces, that is the working class and the conscious socialist forces can be the champions of imperative socialist transformations in society through the most diverse forms of social actions for power and the leading role in society. However, the fact remains that such social action by the socialist forces can be successful only if their most progressive and revolutionary section is capable of really adjusting the means and methods used for such action to contemporary conditions in various countries or parts of the world.

In other words, while indicating the changes in contemporary capitalism and to a certain extent the altered conditions of the struggle for socialism, the Programme simultaneously opposes any interpretation of these new manifestations in a way that could demoralize the contemporary labour movement and progressive forces in their struggle to strengthening their social and political positions in the struggle to win state power in which the working class and its interests would have the leading role, thereby securing the most rapid possible social transformation.

The Programme also rejects narrow dogmatic concepts that do not or do not want to take into account the fact that the world is turning and developing, and that living revolutionary socialist thought must reflect all such movement if it wishes to be a factor of social progress.

Keeping this in mind, the Programme considers that Communists in their attitude towards the international problems of socialism and peace, should reject all narrow-mindedness in dealing with Party interests and should be capable of perceiving and grasping the social progress of mankind as a whole and as links in the chain of a whole series of diverse social processes and their exponents. Today more than ever before it is necessary for Communists to remember the thesis advanced by Marx and Engels regarding the necessity for the most conscious part of the working class to perceive even the most elementary progress, even the most temporary ally, even the most passing focal point of socialism, progress and peace. We see the socialist world precisely as a unity of all such factors and processes, in contrast to the capitalist, which unifies all factors and processes aimed at maintaining capitalism and imperialism.

Therefore, if we were to pose the question of power independently of such processes and of the role of Communists, this would mean that Communists would be orienting themselves to an automatic downfall of capitalism of some kind which would in itself lead to a revolutionary situation of one kind or another in which the working class would take power. In the Programme, however, our point of departure is the premise that results depend on conscious action of the socialist forces, and the success of such action in term depends not only on objective conditions, but on the extent to which the most revolutionary section of the socialist forces

is capable of discovering objective tendencies and determining the forms and methods of action in accordance with them.

This need was formulated very clearly by Comrade Tito in his report at this Congress when, in referring to the role of the Communist parties he said:

„They are becoming increasingly aware that revolutionary force is not to be found in the vanguard alone but that this force exist latently in the masses who are striving for more just social changes while the vanguard should simply find the right way to mobilize the masses in the struggle for their interests and in keeping with the specific conditions in each country".

In taking a stand on all these questions in the Programme we do so not because we should like to offer advice on the roads and means of struggle, but because this reflects our attitude toward the importance of continuous and persevering struggle for unity, cooperation and solidarity in the labour movement and among progressive forces in general.

In doing so, the Programme does not undertake to support any specific form or scheme for unity as being permanently or unconditionally applicable. The split in the labour movement has objective social roots and we would be the victims of futile illusions if we were to speak of the possibility of overcoming that split completely. However, it is realistic and necessary for the most progressive forces of the working class to endeavour constantly, in spite of divisions and ideological differences to achieve the greatest possible measure of coordination and association with all movements and actions which can at a given time advance us a step further in the struggle for peace, for social progress, for socialism. As Marxists, we must appraise what forces, what movements, what actions and what exponents of such actions are carrying out a progressive role in the given situation and struggle on that basis for suitable forms of cooperation and unity. Sometimes, that can be unity of action, sometimes organized cooperation, and sometimes even unilateral support, when, as Marxists, we consider that a specific action is progressive, independently of the political and ideological concepts of the champions of that action.

Therein lies the essence of our struggle for unity with other socialist and progressive movements. We are enduring in that struggle for unity and we shall endure in it, whether or not such a desire for unity exists on the other side. In other words, whatever the attitude of the other side toward unity, we shall support those actions and movements which have a progressive role or contribute to peace at the given moment.

On the other hand, struggling for unity and cooperation everywhere where they contribute to peace and social progress, we do not naturally renounce ideological struggle and the criticism of opportunism, reformism, dogmatism, revisionism, etc. In keeping with our stand, we shall oppose all attempts at interference in our internal affairs or the imposition of alien concepts. Unity without a struggle of this sort would mean stooping to positions devoid of principle, to an obscuring of revolutionary socialist perspective, fostering disorientation in the labour movement, passive endurance of the burden of ideological conservatism and the influence of the atmosphere of decaying capitalist society.

I should especially like to say a few words about cooperation between the League of Communists of Yugoslavia and Communist parties. It is self-evident that we feel solidarity with all Communist parties on all questions connected with the defense and the development of socialism and social progress, the strengthening of the labour movement and consolidation of peace. In that respect, the League of Communists has always been loyal to the great revolutionary idea of proletarian internationalism. We are also bound to the

other Communist parties by the ideology of Marxism and Leninism. However, in this respect the Programme makes the provision that such cooperation should rest on complete voluntariness and equality, that it should exclude the imposition of a stand by the majority and that it should recognize the exclusive right of each individual party to appraise the suitability or the ideological or tactical correctness of this or that action.

When stressing such principles of cooperation, we are guided primarily by experience from the past when one organization for mutual cooperation, the Cominform, was turned into an instrument of pressure on Yugoslavia. Much has changed since then and we do not claim that the same conditions for the repetition of such manifestations exist today as well. However, the contradictions of the transitional period and the powerful influence of the present international situation on relationships between socialist countries can still be a source of diverse mistakes and negative tendencies; that is why cooperation should be founded in a way making it impossible or at least more difficult for such tendencies to assert themselves.

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IN THE PART dealing with social processes in the present day world, the Programme presents some of the general views of the Yugoslav Communists on the problems and laws of the period of transition in socialist countries. Although these problems are primarily dealt of our own experience, we considered it nonetheless necessary, in the part of the Programme which deals with the international political situation, to emphasize those aspects which can today be said, to represent more or less the laws governing socialist development.

The Programme does not portray the situation in the socialist countries, nor in our country, in a propagandist way but portrays it as an organic social process which evolves through objective contradictions, and even antagonism, arising from the vestiges of old social relationships. In this respect, the Programme points out that, apart from remnants of the bourgeoisie and capitalism, the insufficiently developed productive forces in the transitional period, inevitably give rise to bureaucratic tendencies, which represent a social force striving to preserve specific transitional forms in social relationships, and even tending to statist deformations.

We are sometimes reproached for speaking about these tendencies and features of bureaucracy. Yet, this task was pointed out many times by Marx, Engels, and Lenin, who attributed cardinal significance to it in the construction of socialism.

Accordingly, we Communists have no reason, nor have we the right to conceal the fact that tendencies towards the assertion of bureaucracy do exist, that certain social and economic and political conditions favorable to them exist at specific period of time, and that they constitute a source of certain negative conceptions which, in fact, represent an ideological remnant of the old capitalist social order.

Actually, if we were to deny the existence of these phenomena and were not to reveal their sources and their causes, we would not be able to fight them effectively. Moreover, we ourselves might, in given cases, succumb to their influence and thus cease to be the most progressive social force.

For that very reason, we consider that the struggle against bureaucracy is an ideological — political instrument of principle in the construction of socialism.

In that respect, the Programme does not look upon bureaucracy as a characteristic displayed by individuals, although it does exist as such, but as a feature of social relationships in the period of transition. The young socialist society can no more eliminate all the vestiges of capitalism overnight, than it can liquidate the manifestation of bureaucracy overnight. These phenomena characteristic of society of

the transitional period can be overcome only in the course of a long process of social development. That is why the Programme is resolutely opposed to the attempts made by various spokesmen of reaction and destructive anarchy to exploit these inevitable, though passing phenomena, for an attack against socialism itself. It is not essential to raise a hue and cry against bureaucracy, nor to advance demagogic and anarchic criticism of the role of the socialist state, nor to conceal that bureaucracy exists, but what is essential is for the conscious socialist forces to fight persistently and unceasingly for the gradual elimination of all the remnants of class society and thus also of bureaucratic elements, from the social organism.

In view of the growing role and force of socialism in the present day world, it is becoming increasingly obvious that precisely these problems of socialist construction rank among the most important problems of contemporary social development. For that reason the Programme draws the attention of Communists and of all socialist forces in our country to these problems.

The Programme in particular stresses the relations between socialist countries. These relations should not and cannot be embodied in the concept of coexistence. On the contrary, they should increasingly take on the character of relations between free peoples, that is relations of cooperation on a basis of equality, rapprochement and unification. However, the creation of such relations is also an organic process, as is the construction of socialism, generally. And in the course of this very process, during the period of transition, when marked economic and other inequalities still prevail between peoples, and when the laws which imperialism has imposed still rule in the world, unsocialistic tendencies may under specific conditions, appear in that sphere as well. Accordingly, the Yugoslav Communists should have well-defined and clear principles governing the relations and forms of cooperation between socialist countries.

With regard to peace in the world, we support every action and measure, irrespective of the social and political character of its exponents, which we consider can genuinely contribute to the relaxation of international tension and strengthening of peace. On the other hand, with respect to the defence and advance of socialism, we lend our support to, and feel full solidarity with every country which is proceeding along the socialist course. We may, of course, have our own conceptions and critical opinions with respect to the concrete development of socialism in one country or another, but we never forget the historical substance of all these processes.

The transition from capitalism to socialism, as Marx emphasised, is just as replete with difficulties and convulsions as were all such transitions in history. But it is essential for all these processes to be resolved by the internal forces of every country. Just as we adhere to the principle that socialism cannot be exported or imposed by force upon other peoples and that no one can prescribe the socialist form any one country shall apply, too, do we consider aggressive every attempt at interference in the internal life of a socialist country for the purpose of restoring the old order or of encouraging the vestiges of the reactionary forces in those countries. We have always opposed such practices and shall continue to oppose them in the future. We all know full well that attempts of this kind are not the result of any concern for freedom of democracy, as is alleged by trivial propaganda, but that they are aimed at the restoration of the capitalist order.

On the other hand, it is only natural that different socialist countries should have different attitudes towards questions involving the concrete interests of their peoples, matter only they alone can decide upon, as well as on questions relating to the methods, forms and tactics to be used in the construction of socialism, in the struggle for

peace and international cooperation. The contest of opinions which inevitably finds expression in such questions is in fact a factor favoring the advance of socialism, a factor making it possible to overcome stagnation, distortions, and other negative tendencies in the development of socialism.

For these reasons, the Programme rejects those forms of mutual relationships which could limit the independence of socialist Yugoslavia in regard to these matters or which would impose any type of ideological monopoly upon it.

I feel it is necessary to say a few words about the theses of the Programme which refer to the struggle for the consolidation of peace.

In the first place one should not forget that our policy is not and cannot be a policy of unrealistic pacifism, of colourless neutrality, a policy of oscillation between contradictions, or one divorced from the actual relationship of social and political forces in the contemporary world and their substance. On the contrary our policy had and must have a socialist character based on principles.

In our foreign policy we always take the following into account: first, that we are a socialist country and that the strength and development of socialism in our country and security of our country depend to a great extent upon the development and strengthening of socialism in the world, generally; and second, that this fact no less than our international attitude, imposes upon us definite obligations towards international socialism. Thus, our approach to questions relating to the strengthening of peace and to coexistence takes these socialist positions as its point of departure.

In principle, in these questions we adhere to the attitude adopted by Lenin. However, in doing so we take into account the fact that the position of a socialist country in the world today is different from that of the Soviet Union in Lenin's time. In the first place the October Revolution was the first break through of the capitalist-imperialist system. It had to wage a life and death struggle against the old system which encircled it and which was strong enough not only to prevent the spreading of the socialist revolution outside the territory of former Tsarist Russia, but also to resort to direct counter-revolutionary intervention and the launching of an aggressive war.

In that situation Lenin raised the question of coexistence in principle, in the same way as it is being raised today. He looked upon coexistence as upon an inevitable phenomenon and law of the period of transition, as opposed to Trotskyist and similar theses on revolutionary war against capitalist states as a form of world revolution. However, the practical political and tactical value of the thesis on coexistence was at that time far smaller than it is today both for the Soviet Union, as the only socialist country, and for the entire revolutionary working class movement.

For Lenin, the slogan of coexistence was a means of defence, a barricade of the revolution. Pointing out the possibility of coexistence, Lenin was in fact seeking the support of the international proletariat and of the conscious socialist forces in safeguarding the October Revolution. However, Lenin was fully aware that the slogan of coexistence at that time was but a weak barricade of the revolution, because the bourgeoisie was strong, international capitalism still vigorous and capable of launching counter-offensives against the October revolution, and of actually preparing to wage an aggressive war against the USSR. It was therefore natural for Lenin to say: coexistence — yes, but the working masses must not forget that imperialism is not in favour of coexistence and that it will sooner or later attempt to destroy us.

The present situation in the world differs very much from the situation in Lenin's time. In the first place, socialism, from a historical point of view, has won a victory ideologically and materially. It is today no longer encircled, isolated, nor is it in a position of having to defend its very existence.

This in no event means that the most reactionary leading quarters of capitalism have discarded the idea and hope that they will be able to square accounts by force with socialism. However, the balance between the forces of capitalism and socialism in the world today is such as to make these hopes less and less realistic even in the eyes of the most hardened advocates of capitalism. For that very reason the idea of peaceful and active coexistence is winning a growing number of followers not only among the broad sections of the people but also among certain bourgeois political quarters.

It is precisely this which gives Lenin's thesis on peaceful coexistence a far greater significance today in the policy of the socialist forces. It has become not only a realistic conception of peace but also a living slogan in the struggle for the further strengthening of socialism. Under conditions of relaxation in international tension and peace, the peoples are turning their attention to their own social problems. And that means that the social role of the working class will inevitably strengthen, as will also the forces of socialism.

Hence, coexistence for us is not a static, pacifist slogan. On the contrary, we are for coexistence precisely because we consider it to be not only an instrument of peace but also the quickest way to the further development and strengthening of socialism under the present conditions. And, after all, — under conditions when peace is possible — there can be no other alternative for the socialist forces except coexistence.

These premises also constitute the basis of the Programme's view on the attitude of socialist Yugoslavia towards the contemporary division of the world into blocs.

First of all, we see in the division of the world into blocs the reflection of the objective state of affairs in the social, economic and political relations of the contemporary world, which also, in a specific way, reflect the fact that the world today is divided by the contradictions between capitalism and socialism, that today two worlds are living, intermingling and fighting side by side: one is the capitalist world and the other the socialist world, and regard both these worlds not in terms of geography but as a combination of all factors which operate either in the one or in the other direction. In that sense, therefore, both these worlds live and will continue to live alongside the other during a given historical period, irrespective of the existence or non-existence of blocs.

For that reason, the criticism levelled at us to the effect that we are combatting certain external forms, while failing to perceive their substance and thus putting them on a par with each other, or to the effect that we are advancing unrealistic request for the unilateral abolition of blocs, irrespective of the objective contradictions and of the real balance of forces and tendencies in the present day world, are in fact aimed at the wrong target and reveal a profound incomprehension of our attitude. We judge the character of blocs according to their concrete role under given conditions. In that respect, the Warsaw Pact — as an international factor — will no doubt have a defensive role as long as the reactionary forces in the world endeavour to exploit the Atlantic Pact and other similar organizations as an instrument in the anti-communist crusade.

However, we consider that the forces of peace and socialism as well as the anti-imperialist forces in the world today have grown to such an extent that it is possible to conduct a successful struggle against the predominance of policy pursued from positions of strength in international relation and, that a new world war is no longer inevitable. By no means do we wish to assert that a war is impossible, nor do we wish to underestimate the role of those factors which can in the contemporary conditions become the exponents or are already the exponents of aggression. Nonetheless, lasting peace is today far more than just a pacifist human

aspiration; it has become a profound social need. And this is being reflected ever more powerfully not only in the consciousness of the masses, but also in many responsible leading quarters at the head of different states. To link up the material forces of socialism in an adequate way — in the first place — those of the socialist countries with all those factors which are convinced of the necessity to ensure peace, regardless of their social-economic and ideological orientation, means to strengthen the faith in the possibility of coexistence and to strengthen the position of peace in the world. Accordingly, we are all fully aware that the division of the world into blocs cannot be done away with by means of discussion on the mechanical, unilateral disbandment of the blocs, but only by removing those causes in international relations which have led to their creation. And this primarily means by struggle against the domination of power politics in international relations, which has been imposed upon the world by the reactionary opponents of the policy of coexistence, that is, through the struggle for active coexistence, based on constant efforts for disarmament and on the promotion of democratic relations between peoples. We consider that certain of the foreign — political proposals of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries of the last few years act precisely in that direction. All governments and all men whose interests lie in peace should also act in that direction, irrespective of whether they belong to one or another of the military-political pacts or are not aligned with them.

The independent foreign policy of socialist Yugoslavia which is not committed to any military-political pacts also operates in that direction. We still think that Yugoslavia can, by conducting such a policy, contribute most not only to the consolidation of peace but also to the strengthening of the socialist forces. And conversely, by abandoning these positions Yugoslavia would only contribute to intensification of antagonisms in Europe and would thereby be inflicting harm upon the genuine interests of international socialism. It would be senseless to fight for the victory of the principles of peaceful coexistence while at the same time acting in a way which would only heighten tension in the world. The Programme as a whole reflects this attitude which has also found expression in the formulations contained in the section dealing with foreign policy.

Accordingly, those who criticize our Programme are far from the truth when they say that our attitude toward blocs is a vacillation between socialism and capitalism, a sort of „sitting on the fence”, who fail to see that our attitude is a concrete form of the struggle of a socialist country for peace and coexistence and thereby for the defence of socialism generally.

That is all I have to say about the section of the Programme dealing with the foreign policy.

III

AS FAR as the history of our Party is concerned, the Programme contains only a brief survey, whose purpose is to point out primarily the causes which made the Revolution in Yugoslavia inevitable, as well as to indicate its character and the character of government which emerged from it.

Offering a brief survey and appraisal of our Revolution, the Programme takes as its point of departure the fact that our Socialist Revolution became inter-linked with the People's Liberation War and with the elements of a democratic revolution. The different elements of the revolutionary process found rather strong expression in the different stages of the Peoples Liberation War. However, those factors which gave this revolutionary war the character of a socialist revolution predominated all the time, irrespective of the social and political character of the tasks that were resolved in the

course of the People's Liberation War. These factors were primarily the class pattern of the People's Liberation Movement which was a form of the revolutionary alliance of the working people and whose ideological and political nucleus was the working class, as well as the indisputable leading role of the Communist Party. As a result of such a class structure of the People's Liberation Movement and such political leadership; the bodies of government which sprung up from that movement, were bodies of revolutionary power of the working people. In the course of the People's Liberation War, these bodies carried out a number of measures which were socialist in character or had socialist tendencies. Not for a moment was the irrefutable leading role of the working class, of its Communist Party, in question in the course of the People's Liberation War. This, in essence, predetermined the entire course of development of our revolution along the lines of a socialist revolution, while the interlinking of revolutionary-democratic and national-liberation elements endowed it with the specific political forms through which it was manifested.

Naturally, the Socialist Revolution gained full impetus in the closing phase of the war and immediately after the war through the establishment of the People's Democratic Republic and the nationalization of the basic means of production. These changes, as well as the general policy resulting from the character of the people's government in which the working class, from the very outset, held the indisputable leading role and which, accordingly, represented a specific form of the dictatorship of the proletariat, from the very beginning endowed the new Yugoslav federal community with the character of a socialist state.

With respect to the problems related to the building up of our political and economic system, I should like to call your attention to certain general ideological, theoretical and political premises which our Draft Programme takes as its point of departure.

The Draft considers that, on the whole, every social system is determined primarily by the character of power and the character of social-economic relations, that is, by ownership of the means of production. However, the Programme must take into account the fact that there has been no such thing as a pure system in history so far, either with respect to economic relations, or with respect to the structure of government. History is no static series of systems which succeed each other in a „pure” form. The „new” comes into being within the fold of the old systems and triumphs over the „old” in the course of long struggle. The conditions and forms of that struggle influence the character of the new which has defeated the old. Accordingly, even when it is victorious, the new carries within itself many elements of the „old” which endeavours to assert itself in new forms, while these vestiges of the „old” in turn influence the development of new socialist relations. Neither does the Revolution mean mechanical and complete break with the „old”. As a leap from quantity into a new social quality, it represents a political and social-economic victory of the most progressive social economic factors which have already developed in the fold of the old society. But to what extent these factors will leave a mark upon the new society does not depend only upon the radical character of the Revolution, that is, upon the revolutionary consistency of the leading political forces, but upon the objective strength and role of progressive social and economic factors in the general social-economic pattern of the given society; and that, of course, primarily depends on the level of development of productive forces. And more than that, this second objective factor in the final analysis has the final word in the development of a new society. Marx always stressed that men cannot simply choose of their own free will the form of society they want. Neither men nor society can transcend over themselves and

become something that they are not. Through their conscious action, they can change the conditions of their development and progress and thereby change themselves, but they must take as a point of departure what they actually are at the given moment. In other words, that conscious social action which is usually called "the correct policy" of the victorious leading revolutionary forces, can be "correct" that is, successful and progressive only when in a *real social and economic structure*, it is able to find those objective social and economic factors which at the given phase alone carry progress forward and inevitably do so, and when it rests upon these factors. It is only along these lines that the power of the revolutionary state can have a progressive influence.

True, the victory of socialism spells the beginning of the gradual disappearance of antagonistic class contradictions and their influence in shaping human consciousness. But social progress continues to evolve through its internal contradictions which though no longer antagonistic still shape human consciousness and the development of that consciousness. Evidently, these contradictions cannot be resolved exclusively by decisions of the leading socialist center. No matter how progressive the consciousness of that leading center in a country might be, it can never be in a position to perceive and penetrate into the essence of socialist social development and all its factors. Conscious action by the socialist forces will therefore always be misplaced if it acquires the aspect of violence against the objective laws of development. Its foremost task is to channel social development to organize it politically and rid it of the obstacles which backward forms of the past and ideological conservatism place in the way of its advancement. Socialist society must accordingly strive towards such internal organization as will make it possible for all the factors of socialist development to move more freely and thereby uninterruptedly and organically to solve the internal contradictions of socialism. In that respect, Communists under conditions of socialist construction can in action apply Marx's words to the effect that the working class "is not called upon to realize any ideals but only to release the elements of the new society which have already developed within the fold of the old bourgeois society which is in a state of decay."

(Karl Marx — Friedrich Engels, Selected Works. Vol. I).

For that very reason, we consider that democracy in the sphere of socialist relationships and socialist social development namely, that the growing impetus of socialist democracy, is the law of socialist advance. I have deliberately mentioned democracy in the sphere of socialist relationships in order to underline that socialist democracy does not mean throwing the doors wide open to antisocialist tendencies, nor the weakening of socialist society in face of the political action of the forces which are the exponents of these tendencies. No abstract liberalism is involved here. What is at hand is the fact that the force of democratic forms in general in socialist country depends primarily upon the internal stability and unimpeded advance of socialist relationships while this stability in turn depends upon the level of development of the economic basis of society as well as upon the democratic mechanism which secures the free movement of socialist factors. The strength of the bourgeoisie did not lie in its questionable humanism and liberalism but in that it had become the most suitable political framework for the development of capitalist society based on private ownership of the means of production, as well as the most suitable framework for the elimination of internal contradictions inherent in the development of the capitalist class itself. That is why this type of democracy could only develop to the extent to which the bourgeoisie was materially and politically capable of paralyzing or checking the revolutionary pressure of the working class as the antagonistic class. And conversely, bourgeois democracy always suffered defeat that is to say

revealed the real character of its class rule whenever the bourgeoisie was confronted by a sharp class conflict.

Neither does socialist democracy take the abstract principles of humanism and liberalism as its point of departure although humanism and liberalism are its principle characteristics. It is nonetheless clear that we would end up by being helpless moralists and the protagonists of empty, shortsighted illusions were we not to view democratic forms from the angle of the real relationship of the antagonistic class forces. The construction of socialist democracy is hence closely linked up with the struggle against the vestiges of the former order so long as they can be or can become a serious political and social factor, as well as against various manifestations of bureaucracy, statism and technocracy, which tend to obstruct the bearers of socialist development. There is no single recipe valid for all times on the forms of dictatorship of the proletariat. But the necessity of socialist development is obvious and categoric; the constant striving towards an ever broader development of democratic forms within which socialist economic, social, political and ideological factors which carry society forward should develop, relieving it both of the pressure from vestiges of capitalist and bourgeois-democratic political forms and from pressure of bureaucratic tendencies. Only these forms of democracy in which, if I may put it that way, socialist economic and social relationship can "rest" comfortably, and in which the working class and socialist society will be safe not only from remnants of the bourgeoisie, but also as Marx says from their own officials, can be a suitable instrument of socialist advance, and only under such conditions can socialist democracy become — in the final analysis — the political form of the withering away of the state. As a result of this attitude we take toward things we not only oppose bureaucracy and various subjectivist dogmas which are engendered by bureaucratic pragmatism, but also various reactionary and disoriented admirers of bourgeois democratic political forms who in their short sightedness opportunism cannot grasp either the social role of bourgeois democracy and even less the role of socialist democracy. These latter tendencies under conditions of socialism represent a kind of contemporary reactionary romanticism which is incapable of perceiving the progressive resolution of the contradictions of socialist development, and instead seek to idealize certain forms of the past which time has left behind for good. Like the class of reactionary romantics in the period of transition from feudalism to capitalism, the contemporary political "neo-Romantics" move primarily within the sphere of ethics, morals, and abstract democratic formulas and principles losing sight of the real social forces and their mutual relationships as well as of their contradictory or antagonistic interests. These interests — together with bureaucracy — are the inevitable product of the internal contradictions of socialist development in the period of transition. The October 1956 events in Hungary clearly indicated that these two very factors, with their pragmatic blindness and their dogmatic and illusion-ridden subjectivism, are capable of instilling new political and social force even in the remnants of the old society and of counter-revolution.

It goes without saying that there can be no perfect and generally applicable recipe for a single correct policy. Similarly, there cannot and does not exist any infallible ideological judge to decide what is right and what is wrong nor is there any priest who could absolve the socialist forces of the errors they committed. And finally, there is no recipe for any perfect socialist democratic constitution which would automatically resolve all internal contradictions.

The only final judge is practice and history. But Communists should boldly assume social and historical responsibility. If they were not to do so, they would be abandoning socialism and social progress to the mercy of reactionary and backward political social forces. However, the historical results of their

"struggle will depend on the place they will be able to find for themselves in society. A simple declaration of loyalty to Marxism and Leninism does not settle matters for — as Marx has said — men are not what they think they are but what they really are. The matter in this case is resolved only by the acting, objective progressive role of Communists in the movement of society.

The task of the Programme of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia does not therefore consist in establishing the class character of government and the inviolability of social ownership of the means of production but in indicating the basic material, social and ideological — political factors and bearers of objective socialist movement and development under given conditions; in indicating the incentive for the operation of these factors; the social instruments and framework within which their operation can be channeled, the possibilities and sources of deformation in such movement and the bearers and social consequences of these manifestations; the means and methods which the socialist forces can successfully apply in their efforts to counter the action of such tendencies, etc.

The Programme places the emphasis on these very questions relating to objective socialist movement, not being content exclusively with general statements on the dictatorship of the proletariat and leading role of the Communist Party because that would inevitably lead it into petrified schematism and futile propaganda in determining forms of socialist progress. To speak of the dictatorship of the proletariat, is not sufficient. The concrete phase of socialist development under conditions can only be determined by an analysis of concrete social contradictions.

Using these premises as a basis, the Programme also deals with the problems of the construction of the state and economic system. In that respect the program points more to the movement and direction of socialist action than it does to concrete tasks or organizational forms in the struggle for the achievement of specific objectives.

The Programme stresses the indispensability of the state as a socialist social instrument in the transitional period as well as the inevitability of its withering away. The problem of the withering away of the state is not regarded in terms of time nor is it considered to be an immediate aim or an aim which will only begin to be realized in the more distant future. This process is considered as an indivisible part of the process of socialist development, or better said, as an inevitability inherent in it, which is realized to the extent to which socialism becomes a reality and a stable social system.

It is clear that this process cannot proceed smoothly or at an even pace in all spheres of social life. Practice so far, I think, has shown that the functions of the state begin to narrow down first in the field of the economy, education, culture, social services, etc. The state is increasingly replaced by various forms of social self-government which have their roots in concrete material and social interests of the working people. The citizens assemble in a democratic manner to settle specific common questions without the state applying any measure of coercion or else only applying such measures in a most restricted form. This refers in particular to economic relations and to the system of the management of the economy on the basis of social ownership of the means of production.

However, in this field too the function of State in terms of coercion cannot wither away overnight. For a long time the State will still remain the indispensable means for regulating definite matters in this domain. This is especially true for the role of the State as the instrument of power of the working people in their struggle against antisocialist forces and activities, or as regards the protection of the country's independence. As long as in international relations the influence of antagonistic social contradictions dominate and

reactionary social forces are to be reckoned as a factor capable of jeopardizing the existence of free development of socialism, the State will remain the indispensable instrument of the working class and the entire socialist society for the protection and stimulation of the socialist progress.

In brief, the Programme does not treat the problem of withering away of the State as dogma or an abstract political formula, but closely links it as a process with the whole organic growth of socialism. Therefore it does not prescribe the time and the way in which the State is going to wither away, but it only points out means and forms through which this process is going to take place, taking as a point of departure the fact that in this case the conscious efforts of the leading social forces, especially of Communist, is as necessary as in all the other fields of socialist creation. Programme in this respect starts from the perception that in our conditions the development of socialist democracy and social self-government should furnish these means and these forms. Programme stresses the special role of the Workers' Councils and Communes in this process which leads the Communes and the whole society towards the transformation into a free association of producers.

We believe that all these forms have already played their part and that in the future they will play even a greater role in the development of socialist developments in our country. However, we do not claim that these forms are the only possible ones in all countries nor do we claim that they will stay unchanged under more developed socialist conditions in our country. Again I should like to repeat that the trend of the progress of socialism and its fundamental laws are common in all countries, but the concrete forms in which this progress is carried out may be and necessarily will be very diverse. This is exactly what we mean when we talk about different roads to socialism.

In the same spirit the Programme treats also the problem of the economic system. Neither in this case does it provide a detailed scheme, but points at objective factors and movements as well as at those instruments of the subjective action of socialist forces on which depend the concrete material and social-political results of the economic development, and of the whole building of socialism in our case.

The Programme presupposes that the general social-economic as well as the concrete material interests of the working man is the most important incentive on which in first place depends the conscious creative activity of the working man. Naturally, this interest is not the only incentive. The very ideological orientation of man and striving for creative work, which is often so strong as to make people ready to bear material sacrifices, represents an extremely important factor in the march of the socialist society. However, this second tendency cannot be generalized or considered apart from the entire social development. Anyhow, the fact remains that socialism is being created in order to make people produce more and at the same time improve also their own material position.

Therefore, our whole economic system should be set on such foundations as to enable this incentive to make itself felt in a corresponding manner. That is why the Programme considers that the entire system of distribution should be based less and less on the power of the State as the administrative exponent of distribution, but more and more — within the framework of the general planned distribution of the national income in rough proportions — to become the function of the very production, Workers' Councils, Communes and other bodies of social self-government, which alone can finally ensure genuine remunerations according to the work done as well as a conscious struggle of every worker for the constant increase in the productivity of labor and development of productive forces. Through this very form — as

is the case with the self-government in production — the producer at last gets back his production and economic base which had been taken away from him by capitalism or rather by the system of class exploitation in general. In this sense the Programme also defines the relation between a common Federal economic plan and the independent actions carried out by socialist economic factors. In other words, the Programme does not enter into the detailed description of the economic policy, since this is a matter of everyday practice, but draws attention to those social and material factors as well as ways and means that should be fully taken into account in order to achieve as fast a material and social effect in favour of socialism and man as possible.

The last chapter of the Programme defines the social role of the League of Communists and its methods under the organizations in our society. It includes the theses which we have already formulated, but which have been supplemented by our own experiences. The basic characteristic of the leading role of the League of Communists and its methods under the present conditions are reflected primarily in the striving that the power of the working people should increasingly be transformed from the power in the interests of the working masses into the direct power of these very working masses.

Being led by such aims we have as far back as the Sixth Congress and even before it decisively renounced the method of issuing orders. It is true that we would have been guilty of hypocrisy, if we did not admit that at the present time Communists in our country do exert and they should exert direct influence on the definite key positions of state power,

on which depends the stability of the political order which in its turn ensures as free a development of socialism as possible. However, the League of Communists has at the same time decided to act in ever broader fields of social life as the leading political power primarily through convincing and educating the working people who also directly manage their affairs, stimulated by their own social-economic interests. In this respect we have already achieved good results. During the past few years we have witnessed an extremely fast increase of the consciousness and initiative of the working people who are schooling themselves by the very routine of social management. There is no doubt that this has been to a great extent achieved also by the systematic activity of Communists working in the midst of the people and within such democratic bodies of self-government.

These results are a proof that we are on the right path as regards the development of the role of Communists as well. We have fought both the tendencies to weaken the ideological role of the League of Communists in social life which would lead to the entire development of social life in our country to spontaneity and ideological disintegration and the conceptions that Communists enjoy a monopoly not only over the state power but also over every kind of conscious socialist action. For these very reasons we have also in the past developed the most diverse forms of including the broadest popular masses into making direct political decisions. Practice has shown us that we acted correctly. For this very reason Programme recommends this policy even more strongly.

Some Data on the VIIth Congress

THE SEVENTH Congress of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia opened in Ljubljana on 22nd April, and concluded its work on 26th April. The Congress was attended by 1806 delegates with voting rights. (Serbia elected 697 delegates), Croatia 342, Slovenia 112, Bosnia and Herzegovina 196, Macedonia 106, Montenegro 57 and the Yugoslav People's Army organizations 183. There are 124 members of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia and Revision Commission right of representation the Congress recognized, and one of these a member of the Revision Commission, was also elected a delegate.

Among the 1806 delegates there were 690 workers, 180 peasants, 109 engineers, technicians, educational and cultural workers, 643 various other intellectuals and employees, 175 officers of the Yugoslav People's Army and 9 belonging to other professions. Among the delegates there were 198 women.

Of the delegates attending the Congress, 453 had been admitted to League of Communists before the war, 1,108 during the war and 335 after the war. The average term of membership in the League of Communists was 15 years, 10 months and 5 days.

Eleven delegates failed to attend the Congress (8 were ill and 3 on official duty abroad).

FOREIGN DELEGATIONS AND OBSERVERS

THE SEVENTH Congress was attended by delegations of the Communist Parties of Denmark and Norway; the Asian Socialist Conference, the Japanese Socialist Party, the National Liberation front of Algeria, the Italian Socialist Party; the Swiss Labour Party, The Chilean Socialist Party, the People's Union of Cameroon, the Istiqlal of Morocco, the United Workers Party of Israel, the United Socialist Party of Iceland, observer-representatives from the Communist Parties

of Indonesia, Italy and Tunisia, the National Union of the United Arab Republic, as well as observers from the Communist and workers' parties of the USSR, Viet Nam, Poland, Hungary, Mongolia, Bulgaria, the German Democratic Republic and Rumania.

THE CHAIRMANSHIP

AT THE proposal of Comrade Tito the Congress chose the acting Chairmanship which included: Spasenija Babić, Vladimir Bakarić, Jani Bojčevski, Josip Broz Tito, Slavica Gorovečki, Maks Ceremošnik, Dragan Cvijović, Rodoljub Čolaković, Stevan Doronjski, Ivan Gošnjak, Fadil Hodža, Blažo Janović, Edvard Kardelj, Lazar Koliševski, Franc Leskošek, Milan Mičković, Miha Marinko, Djuro Pučar, Aleksandar Ránković, Dobrivoje Radosavljević, Miroslav Krleža, Djuro Salaj, Pavle Savić, Petar Stambolić, Šoti Pal, Mijalko Todorović, Vida Tomšić, Mika Tripalo, Jovan Veselinov, Veljko Vlahović and Svetozar Vukmanović.

THE SECRETARIAT OF THE CONGRESS AND THE EDITORIAL COMMISSION

AT THE proposal of Svetozar Vukmanović the Congress elected the Secretariat, consisting of the following: Antun Biber, Krsto Markovski, Muhamdin Begić, Mileva Planojević, Velimir Stojnić, Janez Vipotnik, Milorad Zorić.

The following were elected to the Editorial Commission: Jože Brilej, Mita Hadživasilev, Dragoslav Marković, Cvjetin Mijatović, Milutin Miljković, Milka Minić, Bogdan Osolnik, Ivo Sarajčić and Boško Šiljegović.

AGENDA OF THE CONGRESS

1) Statement on the tasks of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia in connection with the international situation

and the internal development of the socialist building of Yugoslavia — given by Comrade Tito;

2) Report of the Central Committee on the work of the League of Communists and report on organizational-political tasks of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia — given by Comrade Aleksandar Ranković;

3) Report of the Central Revision Commission of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia;

4) Programme of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia — given by Comrade Edvard Kardelj;

5) Amendments and additions in the Statute of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia — given by Comrade Moma Marković;

6) Resolution of the Seventh Congress on the tasks of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia;

7) Election of the Central Committee and Central Revision Commission of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia;

8) — Miscellaneous.

VERIFICATION COMMISSION

THE FOLLOWING were elected to the Verification Commission: Rista Antunović, Danilo Biljanović, Jože Borštnar, Savo Grković, Pero Car, Rista Džunov, Nikola Kajić, Ivica Grgić, Milka Kufrin, Ilija Materić, Naum Naumovski, Džavid Nimani, Drago Purić, Milija Radovanović and Vida Tomšić.

GREETINGS TO THE CONGRESS

SPEECHES of greeting to the Congress were delivered by Franjo Gaži, representative of the Socialist Alliance of the Working People of Yugoslavia, Rade Vučković, representative of the Federation of Trade Unions, Tone Kropušek, representative of the People's Youth Organization, Branka Savić, representative of the Federation of Women's Association and Major-General Nikola Kajić, representative of the Yugoslav People's Army. The Congress was also greeted by Stane Peterc member of the Management Board of the Litostroj Works and representative of the workers collectives of Ljubljana, Borge Houman, representative of the Communist Party of Denmark, Tadataka Sata, representative of the Socialist Party of Japan and the Asian Socialist Conference, as well as by Ben Youssef Benkhedda, representative of the National Liberation front of Algeria, Bećir Mehonić, member of the Headquarters Staff of the Youth Brigades engaged in work on the Motorway, Ernest Ouandi, representative of the People's Union of Cameroon, Andrej Petelin, representative of agricultural producers from the surroundings of Ljubljana, Vrečko Blaž, representative of the Ljubljana University, Giovanni Alassio, representative of the Socialist Party of Italy, Jorgen Vogt, representative of the Communist Party of Norway, Inger Hargelsen, representative of the United Socialist Party of Iceland, Salamun Korbolan, representative of the United Socialist Party of Chile, and Mulay Mechtī Alan, delegate of Istiqlal.

The Congress received a number of telegrams of greetings from this country and abroad, including messages from the United Socialist Party of Catalonia, the Communist Party of Austria, Neodestur etc.

THE CONGRESS COMMISSIONS

THE CONGRESS elected the Commission for the Programme of the League of Communists, which was constituted as follows: Predrag Ajtić, Ljupčo Arsov, Filip Bajković, Vladimir Bakarić, Anka Berus, Josip Broz Tito, Dobrica Čosić, Rodoljub Čolaković, Stevan Doronjski, Milan Gošnjak, Vojin Guzina, Josip Hrnjević, Avdo Humo, Edo Jardas, Osman Karabegović, Edvard Kardelj, Lazar Koliševski, Boris Krajger, Miroslav Krleža, Veljko Mićunović, Milka Minić, Miljan Neorić, Koča Popović, Milentije Popović, Laslo Rehak, Tine Remškar, Djuro Salaj, Radivoje Uvalić, Jovan Veselinović, Janez Vipotnik, Veljko Vlahović, Svetozar Vukmanović, Boris Zihel and Ana Žilić.

The following were elected to the Commission for the Statute of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia: Vera Aceva, Josip Gazi, Stane Kavčić, Franc Kimovec, Voja Kovačević, Boge Kuzmanovski, Moma Marković, Dragomir Nikolić,

Grujo Novaković, Dušan Petrović-Šane, Mile Počuća, Paško Romac, Stana Tomašević, Todor Vojvodić and Veljko Zeković.

The Commission for the Resolution of the Seventh Congress on the future tasks of the League of Communists consisted of the following: Nisim Albahari, Viktor Avbelj, Vlajko Begević, Jakov Blažević, Hasan Brkić, Ivan Božičević, Krsto Bulajić, Radivoje Davidović, Albert Jakopić, Slavko Komar, Soka Krajačić, Otmar Kreačić, Cvjetin Mijatović, Miha Marinko, Nikola Minčev, Miloš Minić, Lazar Mojsov, Milentije Popović, Krsto Popivoda, Petar Stambolić, Lidiya Šentjurc, Mijalko Todorović, Dobrivoje Vidić, Svetislav Stefanović and Vukašin Mićunović.

The work of the Congress outside the plenary meetings was entrusted to the following commissions: Commission for questions of the social-political system, economic policy and policy in other spheres of social life; Commission for political-organizational and ideological work of the League of Communists and Commission for questions of foreign policy and international workers movement. Mijalko Todorović was elected president of the first commission, with Osman Karabegović as vice-president, Vjera Kovačević as secretary, Ante Raos as deputy secretary, and Nikola Sekulić as rapporteur. In the second commission Petar Stambolić was elected president, Albert Jakopić, vice-president, Krsto Bulajić, secretary and Toza Kurtović deputy secretary. Veljko Vlahović was elected president of the third commission, with Rato Dugonjić as vice-president, Lazar Mojsov secretary, Ana Žilić deputy secretary and Miljan Neorić rapporteur.

NOMINATION AND ELECTION COMMISSION

THE FOLLOWING were elected to the Nomination Commission: Spasenija Babović, Milutin Baltić, Zvonko Brkić, Tomo Buklevski, Krste Crvenkovski, Uglješa Danilović, Blažo Djurić, Veljko Kovačević, Hajro Kapetanović, Ivan Maček, Božidar Maslarić, Andrija Mugoša, Naum Naumovski, Dušan Petrović, Franc Perović, Jelica Radenković, Aleksandar Ranković, Dušan Sekić, Kolj Široka, Mika Tripalo and Oglja Vrabić.

The Election Commission was constituted as follows: Bosa Cvetić, Jovanka Colić, Miloško Drulović, Safet Filipović, Grga Jankez, Ante Jurjević, Danilo Kekić, Josip Kolar, Radomir Komatin, Ada Krivić, Todo Kurtović, Voja Leković, Djuro Lončarević, Ljubica Mihić, Vlado Majhen, Vukosava Mićunović, Gogo Nikolovski, Mika Šipljak and Deva Velić.

NEW CENTRAL COMMITTEE

THE FOLLOWING were elected to the new Central Committee: Josip Broz Tito, Vera Aceva, Rista Antunović, Ljupčo Arsov, Viktor Avbelj, Ljubo Babić, Spasenija Babović, Filip Bajković, Vladimir Bakarić, Mitar Bakić, Aleš Bebler, Vlajko Begević, Marko Belinić, Anka Berus, Antun Biber, Džemal Bijedić, Jakov Blažević, Ivan Božičević, Marjan Brečelj, Zvonko Brkić, Hasan Brkić, Krsto Bulajić, Josip Cazi, Krste Crvenkovski, Marjan Cvetković, Rodoljub Čolaković, Uglješa Danilović, Peko Đapčević, Stevan Doronjski, Ilija Došen, Rato Dugonjić, Risto Džunov, Fadil Hodža, Strahil Gigov, Ivan Gošnjak, Pavle Gregorić, Mito Hadživasiljev, Janez Hribar, Josip Hrnjević, Avdo Humo, Albert Jakopović, Vlado Janić, Edo Jardas, Djurica Jokić, Blažo Jovanović, Ivo Jovanović, Ante Jurjević, Niko Jurinčić, Osman Karabegović, Ivan Karaivanov, Edvard Kardelj, Stane Kavčić, Danilo Lešić, Lazar Koliševski, Slavko Komar, Nikola Kovačević, Ivan Krajačić, Boris Krajger, Sergej Krajger, Otmar Kreačić, Vlado Kričević, Vicko Krstulović, Dušan Kveder, Voja Leković, Franc Leskošek, Ivan Maček, Šefket Maglajlić, Pašaga Mandić, Miha Marinko, Moma Marković, Krsta Markovski, Božidar Maslarić, Veljko Mićunović, Cvjetin Mijatović, Milka Minić, Miloš Minić, Nikola Minčev, Lazar Mojsov, Karlo Mrazović, Andrija Mugoša, Kosta Nadž, Naum Naumovski, Raja Nedeljković, Miljan Neorić, Marko Nikežić, Džavid Nimani, Grujo Novaković, Bogdan Osolnik, Djoko Pajković, Radovan Papić, Mišo Pavičević, Slobodan Penezić, Punja Perović, Dušan-Šane Petrović, Mile Počuća, Krsto Popivoda, Vlado Popović, Koča Popović, Milentije Popović, Jože Potrč, Srdja Prica, Djuro Pučar, Nikola Rački, Dobrivoje Radosavljević, Aleksandar Ranković, Ivan Regent, Paško Romac, Ivan Rukavina, Djuro Salaj, Nikola Sekulić, Vidoje Smilevski, Petar Stambolić, Dragi Stamenković, Svetislav Stefanović, Velimir Stojnić, Vlado Šegrt, Lidiya Šentjurc, Boško Šiljegović, Pal Šotić, Mika Šipljak, Mi-

Hajlo Švabić, Blagoje Talevski, Borko Temelkovski, Geza Tičkić, Mijalko Todorović, Vida Tomšić, Mika Tripalo, Jovan Veselinov, Dobrivoje Vidić, Janez Vipotnik, Veljko Vlahović, Olga Vrabić, Svetozar Vukmanović, Veljko Zeković and Boris Žiherl.

NEW REVISION COMMISSION

THE FOLLOWING were elected to the new Revision Commission: Milutin Baltić, Savo Brković, Tomo Bullevski, Vančo Burzevski, Bosa Cvetić, Stjepan Debeljak, Mirko Djurović, Blažo Djuričić, Dimitrije Georgijevski, Grga Jankez, Pavle Jovićević, Hajro Kapetanović, Jovo Kapičić, Šiška Kolj, Dušanka Kovačević, Leo Mates, Milosav Milosavljević, Mara Naceva, Franc Popit, Petar Reljić, Mitja Ribičić, Ante Roje, Janko Rudolf.

NEW EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE AND SECRETARIAT

THE CENTRAL Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia elected Josip Broz Tito Secretary General of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia.

The following were elected to the new Executive Committee of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia: Josip Broz Tito, Vladimir Bakarić, Ivan Gošnjak, Blažo Jovanović, Edvard Kardelj, Lazar Koliševski, Franc Lekošek, Miha Marinko, Djuro Pucar-Stari, Aleksandar Ranković, Djuro Salaj, Petar Stambolić, Jovan Veselinov, Veljko Vlahović and Svetozar Vukmanović.

Edvard Kardelj and Aleksandar Ranković were elected secretaries of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia.

The Secretariat of the Executive Committee is constituted as follows: Josip Broz Tito, Edvard Kardelj, Aleksandar Ranković, Svetozar Vukmanović and Ivan Gošnjak.

About the Article of »Jen Min Ji Bao«¹

"We consider the criticisms which were brought out by the Information Bureau of Communist Parties in June, 1948 to be basically right".

(From the article "Modern Revisionism Must Be Criticized").

I

JEN MIN JI BAO, the organ of the Communist Party of China, carried on its issue of May 5, 1958 an article entitled "Modern Revisionism Must Be Criticized". The article was published on the occasion of the 140th anniversary of the birth of Karl Marx, yet, in the main, in the form of criticism of the Programme of League of Communists of Yugoslavia, it is wholly devoted to denunciations of the entire policy of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia and Socialist Yugoslavia in general. Actually, the article represents a call to the international labour movement for struggle against what the "Jen Min Ji Bao" terms "Yugoslav revisionism", and neither more nor less but — in the words of the article quoted itself — "for a great struggle upon which depends the success or failure of the cause of the working class in the world and the cause of Socialism". So, the authors of the article, just in the name of "socialist internationalism", pronounce the policy of a Socialist country to be Enemy Number One. This, briefly, is the meaning of that article concerning which we deem it necessary to state our opinion, all the more so since it has already obtained wide publicity.

Of course, there is absolutely no sense to polemize with the "argumentation" itself in the article, considering that even its authors themselves make no effort whatever to prove anything to anybody with arguments and facts. In self-styled and pretentious fashion, they put themselves into the position of arbiters determining the "ultimate truth", that is, "what is right and what is wrong" both in the international labour movement and in the domain of Marxist theory and in the Programme of the League of Communists and the policy of Socialist Yugoslavia. However, pretentiously as the task has been set, its authors nevertheless have not exerted themselves overly in this execution where a search

for arguments is concerned. They simply took the 1948 Resolution of the Cominform from the archives, hurling all possible labels of different revisionist trends which have appeared in the individual countries in specific historical conditions, including even open insinuations about service to imperialists, against the League of Communists of Yugoslavia. Indeed, in the matter of insinuations at the expense of our country and the League of Communists, the article in the Chinese newspaper certainly represents the highest pitch reached by our "critics" during the last several years. To all that has been added a suitable dose — mildly speaking — of very unsavory and entirely superfluous warnings. Superfluous because the League of Communists of Yugoslavia has been steeled in the fire of revolutionary struggle, as a result of which every attempt at pressure can only produce resolute resistance among Yugoslav Communists.

We do not propose to descend to such a level of discussion, so we do not intend to polemize with the text of the article. In the addendum to this article we have reprinted all excerpts from that article relating to Yugoslavia, and we are convinced that our reading public will know how to form an adequate judgment of the degree and character of that "Marxism-Leninism" which the "Jen Min Ji Bao" is so anxious to impose on Yugoslav Communists and Socialist Yugoslavia with such thunderous salvos.

None the less, in this a serious question still arises for us, namely, the question of the purpose and role of the article in "Jen Min Ji Bao" and of the effects that article and policy reflected by it may have upon international Socialism. It is, therefore, necessary that we state our opinion about actions of this type.

Is the purpose of the article in question the discussion of ideological differences that may exist between Communist parties? Anyone who reads the "Jen Min Ji Bao" article will readily conclude that such is not the purpose of the article. Of course, we cannot and do not wish to contest the right of anyone to criticize the Programme and policy of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia. But if the idea is that such

¹ The following is a translation of an article which appeared in weekly "Komunist", of Beograd, May 9, 1958.

criticism truly be a contribution to clarification of particular ideological and political questions of international Socialism, then it should not merely be constructive in tone, but also more substantial in arguments, in facts, in analyses, in the opening of perspectives. However, as we have emphasized above, the authors of the article under review neither try to present any arguments nor do they shrink from making the worst insinuations even. Everything simply indicates that the article is designed to frustrate a constructive Marxist clarification of specific problems which confront contemporary Socialism, and to subject a Communist Party to some kind of an „ideological isolation” merely because it highlights certain of those problems. Therefore, it is not a question of some comradely discussion between two Communist parties, but a crude severance of such a discussion.

Since that precisely is what is involved, the authors have written the article as though they had never read the Programme of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia. We would prefer to believe that they really have not read it, because we find it hard to reconcile their type of writing „criticism” with that scientific and Socialist conscience which should distinguish the writers to well-meaning criticism of a Communist programme. And, after all, for writing the type of article like the one cited in „Jen Min Ji Bao”, the writer, indeed, has no real need to read or probe that which he criticizes. Here it is not a question of a criticism and discussion, but a condemnation without discussion which someone unconditionally has to put into effect. And precisely in this — besides its great harm — also lies the great internal weakness and untenability of this article and the policy it reflects.

As soon as the reader has established this characteristic feature of the article, he will then not be surprised by the entire manner of thinking of its writers, nor by the method and the further logic of the proceeding which is employed in this supposed criticism of the Programme of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia. Since the authors make no use of arguments, facts, proposals, scientific analyses, etc. they automatically have to resort to the method of setting one document against another. Of course, along that line the authors immediately appear with chosen documents to which an absolute authenticity ought to be recognized, since any other document inconsistent with the first is proclaimed as anti-Marxist, factional and disruptionist.

For consideration of space, we do not propose to discuss here all that is concealed behind the alleged concern for unity and what genuine concern for unity actually consists of, but we would like to indicate the character of the documents „Jen Min Ji Bao” obviously takes as its point of departure in its criticism of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia and its Programme.

The „Declaration of 12 Communist Parties” is there, of course. We did not sign that Declaration, and at the Brioni Plenum of the League of Communists we openly stated that we did not sign it because we did not agree with the particular premises on which it was based. It has been known for a long time where those differences lie. No one could have doubted that our Programme had to reflect some of the differences existing between the Declaration of 12 Communist Parties and the League of Communists of Yugoslavia. Why is it necessary then that universally known differences suddenly be made into the subject of such an „ideological” crusade, although we had agreed previously that, despite the differences, we can actively and comradely cooperate in the far wider and more significant spheres of the protection of peace, Socialism and the strengthening of progressive forces in the world, where conceptions are identical and the interests common. Only two things are possible in this respect: either the earlier ulterior motives, or they have changed their position for the worse in the interval, reverting to the old

methods in the relations between Communist parties and Socialist countries which they themselves criticized.

We do not desire to give an answer to this question. Time will tell. But it should be clear to all that the League of Communists of Yugoslavia and Socialist Yugoslavia do not want to be and will not be the passive object to anyone’s policy. Consequently — as comrade Tito said at the Congress — „it is only a waste of time for any side to expect that we shall deviate from our principled attitudes, whether in international or domestic questions”, that is, if anyone thinks that Socialist Yugoslavia could, either by pressure or empty tactical manoeuvres, be induced to abandon its principled positions which, it is our profound conviction — whether the authors of the article in „Jen Min Ji Bao” acknowledge it or not — deeply coincide with the spirit of Marxism-Leninism.

II

CONSIDERING that in the words of „Jen Min Ji Bao”, the Programme of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia was „anti-Marxist and revisionist”, from the beginning to the end, the Declaration of 12 Communist Parties was still insufficient to achieve that end. As a result, the authors of the article drew forth from the archives the notorious resolutions of the Cominform against Yugoslavia. And so the reader, when he has perused the „Jen Min Ji Bao” article, can very readily discover that its authors do not start from some new „critical” revelations in the Programme of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, but that they more or less repeat the Resolution of the Cominform instead. This is already clear when a simple comparison of the text of that article with the familiar Resolution is made.

Point One of the Resolution says: „The Information Bureau finds that the line of the leadership of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, has been inadequate recently in the fundamental questions of foreign and domestic policy, that it has been drawing away from Marxism-Leninism”.

And the Chinese article says that „the Draft Programme brands the fundamental principles of revolutionary theory which was established by Marx and Engels and developed by Lenin and other great Marxists...”

Point Two of the Cominform Resolution refers to „the inimical policy of the leadership of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia toward the U. S. S. R.” and „the slanderous propaganda which has been borrowed from the arsenal of counter-revolutionary Trotzkism”.

And the Chinese article says: „Talking like the reactionaries of all countries and like the Chinese bourgeois rightists, the leading group of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia has maliciously slandered the proletarian dictatorship... They spitefully slander the Socialist camp”.

Point Three of the Cominform Resolution says that „the leaders of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia have deviated from the standpoint of the working class and removed themselves from the Marxist theory of class struggles”.

The Chinese article goes a step further and asserts that the leaders of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia are making an attempt „to induce the working class and the working people of different countries to take the road of capitulation before capitalism”.

Point Four of the Cominform Resolution proclaims that „the leadership of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia is revising the Marxist-Leninist teaching about the party”.

The author of the „Jen Min Ji Bao” article quote the Declaration of 12 Parties in which says, inter alia: „Modern revisionists... deny the leading role of the Marxist-Leninist party, they repudiate the principles of proletarian internationalism and call for the rejection of the Leninist principles on the organization of the party and, above all, the principle

of democratic centralism and seek the conversion of the Communist Party, from a militant revolutionary organization, into some sort of a debating club".

Following up the quotation, the authors of the Chinese article, avoiding the contents of the Programme of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, simply add: "Clearly given in the Declaration are the characteristic features of modern revisionists which are manifest in the content of the Draft Programme of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia". They are not concerned with the fact that the contents prove the opposite, since their aim is not an objective presentation of the Draft Programme.

It is true that in the same Point of the Cominform Resolution the Communist Party of Yugoslavia is criticized because it has no specific programme of its own. Ten years later the League of Communists of Yugoslavia is criticized because it has adopted a programme.

In Point Five of the Cominform Resolution the "Despotic regime" and the "bureaucratic system inside the Party" are criticized. This time that point has been omitted.

Point Six of the Cominform Resolution asserts that "criticism of Communist parties, the mistakes of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, constitutes a brotherly help whereby all the conditions are created so that the leadership of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia may quickly correct the mistakes made. However, the leaders of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, instead of honestly accepting this criticism... have received the criticism with hostility".

The "Jen Min Ji Bao" article says: "The Communist parties of different countries have adopted an attitude of patient expectation in hopes that the leaders of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia will return to the Marxist-Leninist point of view in the interest of the Yugoslav people's allegiance to the path of Socialism. However, the leading group of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia has shown contempt for the well-meaning efforts of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Communists of other countries".

In Point Seven of the Cominform Resolution the non-participation of the leadership of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia in the Bucharest session of the Cominform is criticized.

The writers of Chinese article emphasize that the Draft Programme "adopts an attitude against the Declaration of the conference of the representatives of Communist and workers parties of Socialist countries and... condemns the 'Peace Manifesto'".

Point Eight of the Cominform Resolution asserts that the leaders of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia "have taken the road of betrayal of the international solidarity of toilers and are passing to positions of nationalism".

The Chinese article says: "The programme formulated by the Yugoslav revisionists agrees exactly with what the imperialists need, American imperialists in particular", and also: "The Draft Programme places... bourgeois nationalism in the place of revolutionary proletarian internationalism..."

The familiar Resolution of the Cominform closes with a call to replace the leadership of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia.

The writers of the "Jen Min Ji Bao" article, in a round-about form, actually demand the same thing by asserting that the policy of the leadership of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia "is directly harmful for the fundamental interests of the Yugoslav people".

Such a method of "analyzing" the Draft Programme of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia has logically led the

authors of the "Jen Min Ji Bao" article to establish the following: "We deem that the criticisms the Information Bureau of Communist Parties advanced in June, 1948 are basically right".

III

THE AUTHORS of the article hedge themselves off from the "omissions and mistakes in the methods which the Cominform adopted at that time" and proclaim the second resolution, adopted in November, 1949, to have been "wrong".

We are better conversant than the Chinese Communists what kind of "omissions and mistakes in the methods of the Cominform" were in question, but, regrettably, we have to establish that in some Communist parties there has been all too manifest a tendency to readily "forget" all those "omissions and mistakes", and all too little a desire to draw the necessary conclusions therefrom which would prevent their repetition.

The second Cominform resolution of which the writers of the article say was "wrong" began with the finding that the leadership of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia had committed "open betrayal of the national interests of Yugoslavia", that the "Yugoslav Government finds itself in a complete dependence upon foreign imperialist circles and that it has turned into an instrument of their aggressive policy".

What is the difference between the above insults dating from 1949 and the insults by the authors of the article in "Jen Min Ji Bao" made in 1958 when they say that "the Programme the Yugoslav revisionists have formulated coincides exactly with what the imperialists need, the American imperialists in particular", or when they assert that the policy of the leadership of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia "is directly harmful for the fundamental interests of the Yugoslav people". The question arises whether the Chinese leaders should be the ones to teach our people what is harmful and what is useful or whether this is something that should be judged by Yugoslav Communists and the peoples of Yugoslavia.

The authors of the article continuously employ the expression "the leading group of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia" — instead of "the leading clique" as the second Cominform resolution put it. While comrade Tito was called a comrade in the first resolution of the Cominform, the second resolution liquidated that appellation. The writers of the "Jen Min Ji Bao" article have done likewise.

We are well familiar with the attempt of separating the leadership from the party, of separating the leadership into a "group" or "clique". Such attempts have long since met bankruptcy in Yugoslavia, and the inspirers of such attempts have lost all prestige among the working class of Yugoslavia. And not only of Yugoslavia. We don't believe that the writers of the article "Modern Revisionism Must Be Criticized" ignore this. It is all the more surprising to see the methods which have already met with the widest condemnation in the labour movement once resuscitated.

In the light of these facts it is peculiar to see the wrath of individuals when we indicate the fact that "the old, rusty weapons of the Cominform are beginning to be sharpened anew".

The year 1948 and all which it meant and had brought to the fore has left grave traces and an ugly memory in the labour movement. Simultaneously it was also a profound experience and a great lesson. As a result, every attempt to return to the old methods in the relations between Socialist countries and a resurrection of anti-Marxist methods in treating principled questions can only be condemned to failure in advance, being a pale reflection of something which is being broken up and removed from the path of Socialist development by life itself.

Adopting the logic and methods of the Cominform, the Chinese Communists make it their chief task to meddle in the internal affairs of Yugoslavia, to fight against Socialist Yugoslavia, conducting „a great fight upon which depends the world and the cause of Socialism”.

Ten years ago the authors of first Cominform resolution had set themselves an identical task too. It might be useful to mention that, by setting the struggle against Socialist Yugoslavia as the „chief task” — while failing to care for the welfare of their own people, for Socialism in their own country and its adequate development — the authors of the first resolution had experienced an inglorious end, while Socialist Yugoslavia has remained socialist, more solid, stronger, and more united than ever.

What has happened with the majority of those who signed the first resolution of the cominform which the Chinese comrades are so lightly vindicating today? Of the 17 signatories of the resolution from Socialist countries 12 have met an inglorious or tragic end.

Traycho Kostov was sentenced to death. Vlko Chervenkov was dismissed from the office of Prime Minister and sharply criticized. Anna Pauker was expelled from the party. Vasilij Luka was sentenced to life imprisonment. Matyas Rakosi had brought Hungary to the brink of ruin and now lives as an emigré outside his country. Farkas Mihaly sits in prison on account of crimes against his Communist comrades. Geroe Ernöe, too, is in exile. Berman Jakub was branded in Poland due to his violations of legality, arrests and persecutions of honest Communists. Malenkov Georgiy Maximilovich was given a party sentence as an adherent of the familiar anti-party group. Barash Gustav was barred from all party functions. Slansky Rudolf was hanged. Geminder Bedzih, too, was hanged.

We are recalling this tragic chapter from the past of Socialist countries not because we might consider it necessary to accuse someone today, but to indicate the whole paradoxicality of the situation in which the authors of the „Jen Min Ji Bao” article have landed by dragging forth from the archives documents that have been so bloodily and mercilessly disavowed. Therefore, it appears too that great an historical responsibility is assumed by those attempting to resuscitate methods which history has branded with such a fierce stamp of condemnation.

IV

THE OPEN invocation of the Cominform Resolution in the „Jen Min Ji Bao” must cause us anxiety. Likewise to use a catchword which is so frequently employed recently in polemizing with Yugoslavia — „it is not accidental” that just in these days the Chinese press should be republishing the first resolution of the Cominform, giving it a topical significance thereby, putting it, so to speak, back „into effect” once again.

In this connection, it might be a good thing to recall a few facts.

First of all, the 1948 resolution has its logic and those who today feel it necessary to justify it inevitably are going, step by step, further down the road which will take them to the assertion that not Socialism is being built in Yugoslavia (which is already being put between quotation marks in the article), but something entirely different, that is, something which exempts them from an international obligation toward Yugoslavia as a Socialist country, which makes possible an unprincipled hue and cry against her. However, anyone can very easily form an idea for himself about the scientific value and tendency of such „Marxism—Leninism” which determines the Socialist character of a country according to the current political winds and not according to the character of social relations. However, even Stalin’s attempt at an

arbitrary appraisal of the social and political order in Yugoslavia had experienced an inglorious end. In the present conditions, such attempts are all the more doomed to failure. Here no dogmatic scholastics whatever are of any avail. The material facts are there, and facts, in the final analysis, are always stronger than decreed formulas.

For another thing, it is more than surprising — even contradictory, according to the spirit of the whole article — to come out today with a thesis that the first resolution of the Cominform has been right, and the second wrong. As early as tomorrow the opinion might change about the value of this other resolution too. As we have emphasized before, already now the tone and method of the „Jen Min Ji Bao” article do not differ a great deal from the tone and method of the second resolution. In fact, the logic of the article is completely contradictory with the verbal hedging from the resolution from 1949. The method which the Chinese article introduces into the relations between Communist parties and Socialist countries is, in reality, just the method of the first and the second resolution of the Cominform. If this method really were to be reimposed upon Communist parties, then this would mean great harm for the whole of international Socialism.

All this obtains its confirmation when one reads in the article the assertion that „the leading group of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia has shown contempt for the well-intentional efforts of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Communists of other countries” who had cherished the patient hope that the Yugoslav leaders „will return to the Marxist—Leninist point of view”. In other words, the leaders of other Communist parties reputedly had expected Yugoslav Communists subsequently to accept that which they refused to accept in 1948; and merely because they had expected this renormalizing of the relations of Socialist countries and Communist parties with Yugoslavia and the League of Communists took place. Since the League of Communists of Yugoslavia and Socialist Yugoslavia still refuse to subject themselves to such methods, such „patience is over”, according to the „Jen Min Ji Bao” article.

Strange as that logic seems, its meaning is clear. The „Jen Min Ji Bao”, which, without foundation and without authority, usurps the right to determine, in its own words, „the difference between that which is right and that which is wrong is wrong in the vital questions of the international labour movement”, demands neither more nor less but that we, Yugoslav Communists, renounce not only the principles on which we are building our Socialist domestic and foreign policy today, but every independent clarification of Marxist thinking, every independent outlook upon the problems of the international labour movement and Socialism, every independent policy in the struggle for peace and the defence of Socialism and, in the final analysis, every independent development, too, of the problems and forms of Socialist construction in our own country.

If the authors of the „Jen Min Ji Bao” article have really expected us, Yugoslav Communists, to agree to that, then they have fallen into a misconception for which Yugoslavia is not to blame in the least. Yugoslavia’s attitude on various individual questions has always been clearly and publicly expressed and in good time, so that neither special efforts nor a demonstration of some special patience were necessary to be able to understand it. However, if someone thinks that friendly cooperation between Yugoslavia and the other Socialist countries can only be developed if the League of Communists of Yugoslavia changed its principled attitudes, then the question arises what is equality of cooperation secured by and in what way do the method and proceedings introduced by the „Jen Min Ji Bao” article differ from the proceedings and methods declared in the second Cominform resolution. If that is the price and condition of cooperation,

then it is a question of a problem exactly 10 years old, and for Yugoslav Communists that price is just as unacceptable today as it was ten years ago. And just therein, apparently, is the meaning of the call to the leaders of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia "to give sober thought" to "whether it will be in the interest of the Yugoslav people to reject friendship with the countries of the Socialist camp and the Communist parties of other countries".

Fighting always and tenaciously — despite the campaign that has been conducted against our country — for friendly relations and cooperation with all Socialist countries and Communist parties, and accepting along that line their initiative, too, for the normalizing of relations, Yugoslav Communists have considered that a renewal of those relations meant a severance with the old harmful methods which had found their expression in the resolutions of the Cominform and the establishment of the only possible and normal practice in the relations between Socialist countries and Communist parties, consisting in their promoting their relations in a spirit of solidarity and friendship even then when they differ on the specific individual concrete aspects of internal and international policy.

No one has the right to prescribe what the relations between Socialist countries should be like, but every Socialist country has the duty to strive for the maximum possible cooperation within the framework of the common and equal interests of Socialist countries. We have always sought to do that; even when we disagreed with the individual attitudes of other Socialist countries and Communist parties. We also said what we disagreed with and refused to participate in actions we disagreed with, but even so we sought to cooperate in those fields where common attitudes and outlooks existed. Those are essential questions of Socialism, that is, questions of the struggle for peace, questions of the struggle for the defence of Socialism and the Socialist system from every attempt at imperialist meddling from the outside, questions of cooperation in the struggle for the strengthening of all forces of social progress and Socialism, as well as in the support to anti-imperialist forces in the struggle for national independence. Of course, in the realization of those aims every country or Communist party makes an approach, or, rather, should make an approach, in accordance with the specific conditions in which it is operating.

"Jen Min Ji Bao" apparently proceeds from other positions. It oversimplifies matters by considering that peoples in their day-to-day Socialist practice can be classified into some mechanical discipline and patterns of a universal type. "Jen Min Ji Bao" obviously and self-conceitedly forgets the following words of Lenin, although it at the same time usurps for itself the right of determining what is Leninist and what is not Leninist:

... As long as national and state differences exist among peoples and countries — and these differences will continue to exist for a very long time even after the dictatorship of the proletariat has been established on a world scale — the unity of international tactics of the Communist working class movement of all countries demands, not the elimination of variety, not the abolition of national differences (that is a foolish dream at the present moment), but such an application of the fundamental principles of Communism (Soviet power and the dictatorship of the proletariat) as will correctly modify these principles in certain particulars, correctly adapt and apply them to national and national-state differences. The main task of the historical period through which all the advanced countries (and not only the advanced countries) are now passing is to investigate, study, seek, divine, grasp that

which is peculiarly national, specifically national in the concrete manner in which each country approaches the fulfilment of the single international task, the victory over opportunism and "Left" doctrinairism within the working class movement, the overthrow of the bourgeoisie, and the establishment of a Soviet republic and a proletarian dictatorship..." (V. I. Lenin in "Left-Wing Communism, an Infantile Disorder". Selected Works, Volume II, Book II. Published by the "Kultura", 1950. Page 319-320).

However, if the "Jen Min Ji Bao" has forgotten these words of Lenin, we consider them to be of decisive importance for anyone desiring constructively, creatively, Socialistically to approach the problems of Socialist construction in the various specific Socialist country or the appraisal of the policy of the one or the other Communist Party. Consequently we have always sought to be guided by such conceptions. Although, for example, we are convinced that the individual forms and methods of the Communist practices in China do not correspond to the conditions of our country, we have never asserted that those forms and methods do not correspond to the Chinese conditions. And conversely, although convinced that we are on the right road in building Socialist relationships in our country, we have still never tended to proclaim our forms and methods as universal. Or, for example, while disagreeing in the individual cases with some aspects of the foreign-political actions of the individual Socialist countries, we have still sought to grasp the deeper reasons of such acts, without lightly casting various ideological and political epithets such as the "Jen Min Ji Bao" is so abundantly showering on the League of Communists of Yugoslavia.

We have conceived the spirit of the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union as an introduction of broader and more equal relations between Socialist countries and Communist parties and rejoiced over the fact that the individual steps which had been made in the spirit of the decisions of this Congress really had begun to produce serious results to the benefit of entire international Socialism. It is not superfluous to mention that the Declaration of the Government of China of November 1, 1956 had been drafted in such a spirit. For that very reason we had considered the chapter around the Cominform resolutions to have definitively been taken off the agenda. However, the "Jen Min Ji Bao" article now puts things differently. It not only represents a "bringing into force" of the Cominform resolutions against Yugoslavia, but is setting up the methods and proceedings which had accompanied the work of the Cominform and marked a period which even its most conservative defenders describe today as a period in which a series of big "mistakes" were made. If that, really, is the intent of the authors of the "Jen Min Ji Bao" article, then not only the cooperation between Yugoslavia and other Socialist countries and Communist parties stands to suffer thereby, but international Socialism in general.

V

THIS, it seems to us, should give food for thought to the authors of the "Jen Min Ji Bao" article. In other words, there is a real need for "sober thinking" among those who — considering that the League of Communists of Yugoslavia in setting forth its opinion about the contemporary problems of Socialism in its Programme an act of "defiance" — have permitted themselves to point in such a drastic way to the possibility of a severance of friendship with Socialist Yugoslavia. Hence, the "Jen Min Ji Bao" article constitutes far more than criticism of a programme. It is a political document which — in so far as it were to be accepted in the international labour movement — could have far-reaching consequences.

Matterk have their own logic. The League of Communists of Yugoslavia enacted its Programme which is a public document and on which anyone may state his opinion, of course. However, account must, first of all, be taken of the fact that this Programme only commits Yugoslav Communists and none other, and Yugoslav Communists have accepted it unanimously at their Seventh Congress. The Programme may be criticized, yet the right may not be denied to the League of Communists of Yugoslavia freely to adopt its attitude, and even less so may threats be addressed to it about a severance of friendly relations with Socialist Yugoslavia. For another thing, the Programme only determines Yugoslav domestic and foreign policy and the policy of none other. This policy possesses particular specific features, but in the substance and the letter of the Programme this is a policy of solidarity with all Socialist forces on questions of defence of peace and Socialism, on question of strengthening of all progressive forces in the contemporary world. It is the same policy which Yugoslavia has conducted the whole time and which in the last years constituted no obstacle to promotion of friendly co-operation between Yugoslavia and other Socialist countries.

What, then, is it that the authors of the article are rising against? Obviously against the right of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia that it should by itself determine its own policy on the basis of its own appraisals of the domestic and international political conditions and on the basis of experiences from the struggle of other Social forces. Briefly, "Jen Min Ji Bao" obviously raises its lance in defence of the old methods and proceedings in the international labour movement which history has already condemned. Just because of that it overmagnifies the ideological and political differences between the League of Communists of Yugoslavia and some other Communist parties: it conceals that which is common and on which cooperation is feasible and indispensable; it seeks a mechanical formal unity and breaks up the real unity founded upon the internationalistic solidarity of equal parties of the working class. The whole international labour movement is going to suffer thereby.

However, the matter does not end there; the article is also harmful for the present efforts of Socialist and peace-loving forces toward the consolidation of peace. This, too, is something the article's authors should give a "sober thought" to.

It is not the Programme of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia which is assisting imperialists; on the contrary, it is precisely attacks against the League of Communists of Yugoslavia and Socialist Yugoslavia such as are launched by the authors of the article and their likes that are achieving that end. Everybody in the world knows that Socialist Yugoslavia neither threatens anyone nor has she any pretensions of any kind of playing a directive role, nor is she capable of imposing herself into such a role on anyone even if she wanted to. On the other hand, also, the whole world knows that Yugoslavia has made significant and useful efforts along the line of consolidation of peace, including also the support of a series of positive attitudes of the Soviet Union which

were beneficial for the cause of peace and Socialism. What else, then, can the threats about a severance of friendship with Yugoslavia and proclamations of a crusade against "Yugoslav revisionism" signify but the placing of weapons into the hands of the enemies of Socialism? Who else but the enemies of Socialism are to benefit, for example, by the fact that the insinuations about a reputed Yugoslav backing of counter-revolutionary elements in Hungary, which the stated article puts forward, today again give rise to hindrances in the development of friendly relations between Yugoslavia and Hungary? And finally, who else but the enemies of Socialism can benefit when the authors of the "Jen Min Ji Bao" article so lightly pass over that which is positive and useful in the relations between the League of Communists of Yugoslavia and other Communist parties? The authors of the article will not be able to shed responsibility for the damage caused by them to the international labour movement by such acts.

Just because we are conscious of all that we can pass, bitterly but calmly, over the dirty insinuations about the interlinking of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia and its policy with the political plans of American or other imperialists. History has already passed its judgment once on who really benefits by the denunciations and methods such as are manifest in the "Jen Min Ji Bao" article, here reviewed. It would be tragic if all that had to happen all over again. On its part, the League of Communists of Yugoslavia — notwithstanding the unprincipled hue and cry now being conducted against it and against Socialist Yugoslavia, and firmly adhering to its principled positions — will in the future also seek to promote the most fertile relations of cooperation with all Socialist countries and Communist parties, on principles of equality, voluntariness, non-imposition of views, as well as a genuine Socialist internationalism undisfigured by any monopoly. But the success of those efforts of course does not depend on us alone.

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